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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 
1. In June 2013, the Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) 
approved the Full Business Case for the Education and Skills Authority 
(ESA), submitted to it by the Department of Education (DE). Since 
then, the Executive has agreed (1) to withdraw from its 2011-15 
Programme for Government the commitment to establish the ESA; and 
(2) to amalgamate the 5 Education and Library Boards (ELBs) and their 
Staff Commission into a single Education Authority. 
2. The territorial responsibilities of our existing ELBs are defined in law 
(Education and Libraries (NI) Order 1986, Article 3 (2) and Schedule 1) 
by reference to council areas.  Currently this is a reference to the 
existing model of 26 councils and so the ELBs are defined by five 
groupings of these 26 territories.   Under Article 3(4) and Schedule 2 of 
the 1986 Order, each ELB also draws its political membership from the 
councils within the relevant grouping set out in Schedule 1. 
  
3. From 1 April 2015, our 26 council model shall be replaced by the new 
model of 11 councils.  Our Education and Library Boards must 
therefore change to be compatible. This requires new legislation to 
provide from 1 April 2015 for either the configuration of our existing 
ELBs territorial responsibilities to be significantly re-drawn or the 
establishment of a single Education Authority in place of the existing 
structures. 
 
4. The Education Minister concluded that the establishment of a single 
Education Authority offered the best prospect of agreeing and 
implementing a new future that is compatible with local government 
reform.  A move to a 1-Board model would transcend potentially 
complex and contentious issues of boundaries.  By providing an 
overarching, regional compatibility with our 11 district councils, a single 
Education Authority would also be their clear partner in community 
planning. 
5. The establishment of a single Education Authority also offers a realistic 
prospect of consolidating the significant efficiencies that have already 
been made in anticipation of ESA.  To contribute to the Department’s 
Savings Delivery Plan, and in the expectation that ESA would make 
rationalisation sustainable, recruitment has been frozen and large-scale 
reductions made in the workforce of the ELBs and their Staff 
Commission.  Meanwhile, whilst some corresponding development of 
regionally managed services has been attempted, it has been hindered 
by uncertainty. The result of this is that education services in 2015 
remain delivered largely as they were before, despite a reduction of 
over 400 staff.  The establishment of the Education Authority is now 
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needed to make education administration sustainable in the light of 
savings already made. 
 
6. The Minister sought Executive approval to the introduction of Primary 
Legislation via accelerated passage to create a single Education 
Authority on 25 September 2014.  The new Education Bill was 
introduced in the Assembly on 6 October 2014 and completed its final 
stage on 17 November 2014.  The Education Bill received Royal 
Assent and became the Education Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 on 11 
December 2014. 
 
7. Whilst implementation will involve a significant change programme, the 
changes brought forward by the Education Act are mainly structural 
and technical. The creation of EA will represent the first major 
reorganisation of education administration since 1973 and will underpin 
the provision of education for a generation.  At the point of EA’s 
establishment, the following organisations shall be dissolved and their 
functions, assets and staff shall transfer to EA: 
 The 5 Education and Library Boards (ELBs); 
 The Staff commission for the Education and Library Boards 
(SCELB). 
8. The educational case for EA is consistent with and derives from DE’s 
current policy priorities: 
a) a responsibility to improve performance by ensuring that policies 
encompassed in Every School a Good School are delivered 
effectively by schools; 
b) better governance arrangements with a more simplified structure 
of education administration that will support the drive for 
improvement. 
The current structures involve 6 organisations, 6 boards and (at their 
peak) over 175 board members in the oversight of the delivery of 
education services.  By contrast, EA shall have 21 members: 
 Chair 
 8 political respresentatives; 
 4 members representaive of the interests of the Transferors; 
 4 members representative of the interests of Trustees; 
 4 members representaive of the interests of integrated 
schools, Irish Medium schools, voluntary grammar schools 
and controlled grammar schools. 
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9. The overall effect is the creation of an organisation that is a regional 
version of an ELB – different from an ELB only in scale and in 
modernised and regionalised governance and constitutional 
arrangements.  In other words, the reform is structural and technical - 
the minimum required by the imperative that our Education and Library 
Boards’ governance arrangements should have a sound legal basis. 
10. However, the Education and Library Boards historically determined 
different priorities for educational support services (including a range of 
support services for children with special educational needs), different 
levels of funding, and different methodologies in the application of 
departmental policies.  This led to inconsistencies in terms of access, 
quality of provision and educational outcomes across the region.  As a 
single regional authority, the EA will ensure a common approach to 
support services focusing on equality of access and consistency in the 
delivery of departmental policies. 
Objectives and Constraints 
11. The overall aim for the establishment of the Education Authority is to 
ensure that education administration operates efficiently and effectively 
to support the delivery of education-related Programme for 
Government commitments, Ministerial priorities, statutory functions and 
(overarching) educational services to children and young people. 
12. The specific objectives to support delivery of this aim have been 
identified as follows: 
 To provide an administrative structure that is compatible with the 
new 11 council model of local government; and 
 To maintain the delivery of services currently provided by the 
Education and Library Boards and the drive always to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of those services. 
13. The principal constraints which will apply to the establishment of the 
Education Authority, and the alternatives to it as assessed in this FBC, 
are the timeframe provided by the reform of local government and its 
implications for both legislation and implementation; the Education 
Budget; and constraints on the locations for EA as provided by the 
Government’s position on location and dispersal. 
Shortlisted Options 
14. Chapter 5 presents a monetary assessment of the option to establish 
EA and its counterfactual: not establishing the EA – but maintaining the 
5 ELBs and their Staff Commission, and restoring them to levels that 
pre-date large-scale voluntary severance programmes.  
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15. The three main options given are: 
(i) (1) “do nothing”:  this will maintain structures that reflect the defunct 
26 councils and will leave the 5 ELBs and their Staff Commission 
operating at the extremities of corporate risk, with staffing levels as 
at September 2014. 
(ii) (3) reconfigure the ELBs to be compatible with the new district 
council structure and reboot staffing levels back to 2008 when 
vacancy control was introduced under the Review of Public 
Administration for the establishment of the ESA.  
(iii) (4d) creation of a single Education Authority encompassing the 5 
ELBs and the Staff Commission. 
16. Option (1) has been retained to provide a baseline, although this is not 
a realistic option, leaving the ELBs as it would vulnerable to a legal 
challenge that could impact adversely on education services.  It is 
therefore not a fair point of counterfactual reference.  Similarly, for 
Option (3) it is acknowledged that rebooting staffing levels back to 2008 
is unrealistic at a time of severe financial constraint.  However, as in 
the FBC for the establishment of ESA, the staffing information is used 
to provide a comparison of costs and to illustrate savings already 
banked in anticipation of ESA’s establishment. 
Monetary assessment and Net Present Cost (NPC) 
17. The monetary assessment of Options 3 and 4d considers in-scope: 
 staffing costs - costs directly attributable to non teaching, non 
schools based staff that provide services and support to schools, 
including salaries and an approximation of associated non staff 
costs; and 
 costs associated with the implementation of EA.  
 
The appraisal period is 10 years from the base year of 2015/16.  
 
18. The staffing costs for both options are determined with reference to the 
full-time equivalent (FTE) staff baseline position as at September 2014.  
Staffing costs of Option 3 (Status Quo (rebooted)) assume a return (by 
April 2017) to the 2008 staff levels for all grades under Senior 
Management.  The staffing costs of Option 4d (Establish EA) reflect the 
anticipated staffing profile of the Education Authority in steady-state.  
This includes plans for senior management (further detail at Chapter 5, 
paragraph 10-12), which will deliver further savings from the 
September 2014 baseline, and a planning assumption of a 13 per cent 
reduction (by April 2018) at all other grades. 
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19. The ESA FBC assumed that due to  the reduced processing 
requirements of one organisation when set against eight, 10% savings 
would be made from an April 2012 baseline.  Reducing the ELBs and 
their Staff Commission into the Education Authority must have the 
same potential.  Figures for Middle Management, Supervisory 
Management and Clerical and Support grades reflect this and a further 
reduction has been made in light of the more constrained role of the 
Education Authority when compared to ESA.  The planning assumption 
for Option 4(d) is therefore for an overall reduction of 13% at all grades 
below Senior Management compared to the April 2012 staffing levels 
provided in the ESA FBC.  Whilst a reduction of some 50 posts is 
envisaged across the senior, middle and supervisory management 
grades, the scope for reductions has already disappeared in terms of 
clerical and support staff due to the numbers of voluntary severance, 
retirements and resignations since April 2012.  The small overall 
reduction (5 posts) on September 2014 levels is, therefore, net of some 
assumed recruitment of clerical and support staff.  
20. The staffing numbers, therefore, for the basis of the staffing costs of 
Option 3 (Status Quo (rebooted)) are 3026, an increase of 595 on 
September 2014 staffing levels. The staffing numbers for the basis of 
the staffing costs of Option 4d (Establish EA)) are 2426, a decrease of 
5 on September 2014 staffing levels.  The costs for these staffing 
numbers drive the related but non-staff costs (lighting, heating, 
furniture, stationery etc) and so the assumption for these is a 10% uplift 
of the staff costs. 
21. For implementation costs, these reflect redundancy costs (for Option 
4d only) for senior management only; and assumptions made to cover 
other change management and delivery costs.  The total costs over the 
ten year appraisal period are summarised in Table 0.1.  
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Table 0.1: total cost summary 
  
Current 
Baseline 
Option 3  Option 4(d)  
CAPITAL COSTS: £'000 £'000 £'000 
  - - - 
Total Capital Costs - - - 
REVENUE COSTS: 
 
  
Staff Salaries 874,110 1,093,299 862,161 
Non Staff Costs 87,411    109,330 86,216 
Redundancy Payment - - 3,984 
Change Director 
Programme Management  
Office 
- 7,800 2,750 
Recruitment Unit - 600 - 
Accommodation (Chair,  
Board and Directors) 
- - 300 
Excess Fares - 5,100 4,500 
Total Revenue Costs 961,521 1,216,129 959,911 
 
22. In total (undiscounted cost) terms the option to implement EA reflects a 
cost saving, against the alternative position, of £256m over a ten year 
period.  If the cost of redundancy is removed (as it will be in the NPC 
analysis given it is a transfer payment) the cost saving for EA increases 
to £260m. 
Net Present Cost (NPC) 
23. Table 0.2 provides a summary of the options in monetary terms, 
outlining net undiscounted cost, NPC and ranking.  
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Table 0.2 NPCs – options summary 
  Total 
Undiscounted 
Cost 
NPC  NPC 
Ranking 
  £'000 
Current baseline 961,521 827,647 2 
Option 3 (Status 
Quo 
(Reconfigured 
and Rebooted)) 
1,216,129 1,043,193 3 
Option 4(d) 
(Establish the 
Education 
Authority) 
955,927 823,873 1 
 
24. Option 4(d) has the lower NPC when assessed against Option 3. The 
status quo (reconfigured and rebooted) option is comparatively very 
expensive given the need to deliver education from a fragmented and 
inefficient platform.  
25. The differential in NPC terms of £219m (over ten years) between 
Option 4(d) and Option 3 demonstrates the monetary case for 
establishing the Education Authority. 
26. The NPC analysis undertaken and the results presented above are 
based upon a number of important assumptions.  Sensitivity analysis 
has been undertaken to determine if and how variations in key 
assumptions affect the ranking of options in NPC terms.  The analysis 
has included:  
 Reducing the scale of the ‘reboot’ envisaged under Option 3 so that 
staff numbers are increased only to the level they were at in April 
2012; and 
 Reducing the process efficiencies identified under the EA Option 
(Option 4d) from 13% to 10%. 
Applying these sensitivities does not change the ranking of options in 
NPC terms.  
27. The analysis demonstrates that the option of moving to a single 
Education Authority generates considerable monetary savings when 
compared against the alternative option, which would involve rebooting 
the Boards back up to a sustainable operational level.  This cost saving 
is valued in the business case at around £256m over 10 years or 
around £219m in NPC terms. 
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28. The monetary analysis clearly shows Option 4(d), the establishment of 
a single Education Authority, to be the preferred option in monetary 
terms. 
Non-monetary assessment 
 
29. A weighting and scoring approach was taken to assess the options in 
non-monetary terms.  Non-monetary criteria carrying relative 
weightings were developed for the purposes of scoring Options 3 and 
4d. 
 
30. Table 0.3 outlines the scores (0-10) attributed per criteria by this 
exercise for each option.  It also applies the agreed weightings to arrive 
at a total weighted score for each option.  
 
Table 0.3: Non-monetary scoring 
Criteria 
Weighting/ 
Max 
Weighted 
Score 
Current Baseline Option 3 (Status 
Quo 
(Reconfigured and 
Rebooted)) 
Option 4(d)  
(Establish the 
Education 
Authority) 
Score 
Weighted 
Score 
Score 
Weighted 
Score 
Score 
Weighted 
Score 
1. To provide an 
administrative structure that 
is compatible with the new 11 
council model of local 
government. 
 
50/500 0 0 10 500 10 500 
2. To maintain the delivery of 
services currently provided 
by the Education and Library 
Boards and maintain also the 
drive always to improve the 
effectiveness of those 
services. 
50/500 1 50 4 200 6 300 
Total 100/1000  50  700  800 
 
31. Option 4d (Establish ESA) out-scores Option 3 (Status Quo 
(reconfigured and rebooted)).  While both options deliver legal 
compatibility with the new district councils, Option 4d offers the better 
prospect of maintaining and improving the service-delivery of the ELBs. 
This is what the non-monetary scoring reflects. 
 
 
Risk assessment 
 
32. DE, working with other partners, has established a robust process for 
the identification, management and reduction of risks associated with 
the implementation of the Education Authority.  This process will 
manage several important risks and actions, accountabilities are in 
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place to ensure that these risks do not undermine the success of 
implementation.  The process flows from and reflects the Department’s 
corporate arrangements for risk management, including as 
documented in its Risk Management Framework. 
 
33. The option to reconfigure and reboot the ELBs within the education 
sector (Option 3) would bring with it a serious risk in terms of 
affordability and pressure on the education budget, and a margin of risk 
in terms of the effectiveness of service delivery.  It will also sink the 
value of all £18.145m invested to date in restructuring education 
through the ESA Programme.  This exacerbates the affordability and 
budgetary risks when compared with Option 4(d), and risks reputational 
damage and public confidence. 
 
 
Preferred Option 
 
34. Having checked the robustness of the NPC analysis, the NPC results 
are combined with the assessment of non-monetary factors and risk in 
order to identify an economically preferred option. Table 0.4 
summarises the key findings from the economic appraisal carried out 
within the business case. 
 
Table 0.4 Identification of preferred option 
Attribute 
Current 
Baseline 
Option 3 
(Status Quo 
(Reconfigured 
and rebooted)) 
Option 4(d) 
Establish the 
Education 
Authority 
Total Costs over the life 
of the project (£’000) 
961,521 1,216,129 955,927 
NPC (£’000) 827,647 1,043,193 823,873 
NPC Ranking 2 3 1 
Non-Monetary Benefits 50 700 800 
Non-Monetary Ranking 3 2 1 
Overall Option Ranking 3 2 1 
 
35. The assessment of NPC demonstrates that Option 4(d) (Establish the 
Education Authority) offers the potential to realise significant monetary 
savings against the alternative status quo position.  The establishment 
of the Education Authority also demonstrates a greater ability to 
achieve identified non-monetary outcomes than does the alternative 
position.  Furthermore, the risks evident under Option 4(d) can be 
managed through successful management and mitigation, whereas 
those under Option 3 would present more serious challenges and be 
difficult to mitigate. 
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36. “Option 4(d) – Establish the Education Authority” is recommended as 
the preferred option. The establishment of EA represents value for 
money when assessed against alternative options. 
 
 
Arrangements for Financing, Project Management, Implementation, 
Monitoring and Evaluation and Benefits Realisation  
37. Table 0.5 summarises the resource DEL requirements for the 
implementation of EA.  These figures are derived from the NPC 
analysis (Annex II) of Option 4(d) – plus redundancy costs – and 
Option 1 (Current Baseline). 
 
Table 0.5 EA affordability profile (£000s) 
Year 
EA Resource 
Expenditure 
Baseline 
Resource 
Affordability Gap 
Surplus/ (deficit) 
2015/16   99,249 
 
96,152                  (3,097) 
2016/17  100,531  
                  
97,979  (2,552) 
2017/18  101,187  
                  
99,806  (1,381) 
2018/19  101,726                 
                  
101,825  99 
2019/20         102,763 
                  
103,844  1,081 
2020/21  104,746 
                  
105,960  1,214 
2021/22         106,612  
                 
108,075  1,463 
2022/23         108,527  
                  
110,910  1,663 
 
2023/24 110,238 112,402 2,164 
 
2024/25 112,501 114,709 2,209 
Total      1,048,079  
               
    1,050,942  2,863 
 
 
38. Whilst there is a requirement for additional funding (c. £11.5m – see 
Table 0.1) during the initial term to successfully implement EA and 
cover redundancy payments, these costs are offset by the overall 
savings in staff costs through the implementation of the EA.  This 
amounts to a net saving of c. £2.9m over a ten year period when 
compared against the September 2014 baseline. 
 
39. Work towards the implementation of the Education Authority will build 
on structures established to implement ESA. These have been ongoing 
for a number of years now and their management and governance 
arrangements are well established. Accountabilities are defined at 
 
 
 
13 
 
Ministerial level with a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) from within 
DE.  
 
40. A delivery programme is currently defined which essentially ascribes to 
the ESA Implementation Team and the ESA Delivery Directorate 
projects in keeping with their specialised role and experience 
developed under the ESA Programme – with appropriate changes in 
nomenclature (“EA Implementation Team” and “EA Delivery 
Directorate” respectively).  Accordingly, there shall remain two halves 
of the programme: 
 
 The DE Delivery Strand – comprising projects on legislation, 
governance and accountability framework for the Education 
Authority, the establishment of the new sectoral body and 
secretarial support for the whole programme; and  
 The operational strand – covering transition to the new 
organisation, HR and operational continuity and involving 
expertise from the dissolving organisations themselves. 
41. The Department recognises the importance of effective benefits 
management and the realisation of benefits through active 
management.  Therefore, in the development of this FBC and in taking 
forward the programme of work to establish the Education Authority, 
the Department and in particular the key parties to its programme 
structure have worked to identify and profile benefits. 
 
42. Aligning with the objectives (Chapter 3), a comprehensive benefit 
framework has been developed which supports the articulation of 
measurable benefits.  In accordance with the NICS approach to 
Benefits Management the Benefit Framework has been developed into 
a Benefits Dependency Network (BDN), aligning the new tangible 
capabilities that will be delivered by the Education Authority to the 
strategic objectives for the programme through a series of intermediate 
and measurable benefits.  For each intermediate benefit, a detailed 
Benefit Profile has been developed to support its realisation. 
 
43. Following the establishment of the Education Authority, it will be 
essential to assess the effectiveness of the project by carrying out a 
Post Project Evaluation (PPE).  The main objective of this evaluation 
will be to assess and report on the benefits have been derived from EA, 
against those that were envisaged. In line with the timescale of many of 
these key benefits, the PPE will be conducted by DE three full years 
after the formal establishment of the Education Authority with 
arrangements made to ensure objectivity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
1. In June 2013, the Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) 
approved the Full Business Case for the Education and Skills Authority 
(ESA), submitted to it by the Department of Education (DE). Since 
then, the Executive has agreed (1) to withdraw from its 2011-15 
Programme for Government the commitment to establish the ESA; and 
(2) to amalgamate the 5 Education and Library Boards (ELBs) and their 
Staff Commission into a single Education Authority. 
2. As Chapter 5 explains, the scope of a monetary assessment of this 
option and its counterfactual is largely limited to defined workforce 
costs. In these terms (if not in policy terms), the creation of the 
workforce of the Education Authority is a minor variation on the creation 
of the Education and Skills Authority. Similarly, its counterfactual – the 
continuation and restoration of existing structures is a subtle variation 
on the counterfactual to ESA – as tested in its FBC. 
3. For this reason, this FBC’s monetary assessment is a derivation on that 
contained with the FBC for ESA. Otherwise, this FBC has been 
developed in line with the requirements of the Northern Ireland Guide 
to Expenditure Appraisal and Evaluation (NIGEAE) the relevant 
guidance from the Office of Government Commerce to ensure 
compliance with the principles of Managing Public Money and all 
relevant accountability guidelines as laid down by the DFP.  This 
chapter of the FBC sets out the background to the FBC and provides 
an overview of its scope. 
Background: the ESA and Local Government Reform 
4. As Chapter 2 explains, the reason for the proposal to establish an 
Education Authority is to provide a sound legal basis for education 
administration – in a context where the legislation governing the 
existing ELBs would, after 1 April 2015, define their territorial 
responsibilities and constitution by reference to a defunct configuration 
of district councils.  It has long been the intention of the Department 
and the Executive that the long-planned establishment of the Education 
and Skills Authority and the dissolution of the current Education and 
Librray Boards would have been achieved before this date. The fact 
that this will not be achieved raises the prospect of the ELBs continuing 
after the introduction of the new local government structures of 11 
councils.  This is a prospect that should be avoided or limited because 
in law the ELBs derive their territorial responsibilities and significant 
parts of their governance from the old local government structures of 
26 councils.  Urgent structural change is therefore needed and this 
FBC will test the Department’s preferred option – the creation of an 
Education Authority in the place of the 5 ELBs and their Staff 
Commission. 
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5. The proposal to establish an Education Authority is, therefore, very 
different in policy terms and proposed legislation to the recent proposal 
to establish an Education and Skills Authority – even though both are 
near identical exercises in terms of the scale and nature of workforce 
rationalisation that each involves (as shall be demonstrated in the 
monetary assessment). ESA represented the integration of the different 
sectors within education administration. Proposed legislation would 
also have empowered ESA to lead school improvement and the area-
planning of schools – and ESA would have been structured to make 
best use of these powers. ESA represented both a social, educational 
and organisational reform. The Education Authority proposal is 
primarily a response to the need to implement technical and 
adminstrative changes to make education administration fit with the 
new structures for local government – and to make it sustainable in the 
light of efficiencies already made in anticipation of the establishment of 
ESA.  
6. As shall be seen, however, the protracted efforts to establish ESA set 
the strategic context and framework for the creation of the Education 
Authority. It shall largely comprise the combined workforce of the ELB; 
although this has been depleted by 5-6 years of a voluntary severance 
programme that was predicated on the rationalisation to follow from the 
ELBs’ incorporation into ESA. This affects the notion of a “status quo” 
option as shall be explained. 
The Scope of the FBC   
7. The scope of this FBC is therefore limited to structural changes in 
education administration in response to structural change to be brought 
about by local government reform.  It does not pursue the educational, 
strategic planning and social improvements that were envisaged 
through the establishment of ESA.  It is about testing a preferred way of 
meeting a practical imperative for structural change against its 
alternatives. 
8. The objectives and constraints, long-list, shortlist and preferred option 
reflect that the FBC is not about the optimal structures of education 
administration but instead tests the best way, in monetary and non-
monetary terms, for making education administration compatible with 
local government reform. 
The Structure of the FBC 
 
9.  The remainder of this document is structured as follows:  
 
 Chapter 2: Strategic Context and Assessment of Need;  
 Chapter 3: Objectives and Constraints;  
 Chapter 4: Shortlisted Options;  
 Chapter 5: Monetary Assessment;  
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 Chapter 6: Non Monetary Assessment & Net Present Cost; 
 Chapter 7: Assessment of Risk and Uncertainty; 
 Chapter 8: Preferred Option; and 
 Chapter 9: Arrangements for Financing, Project Management, 
Monitoring and Evaluation, Procurement and Benefits Realisation.  
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CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND ASSESSMENT OF NEED 
 
Introduction 
1. This Chapter explains the strategic context of and need for the 
proposal to establish an Education Authority to replace the 5 ELBs and 
their Staff Commission.  The background is the current depleted nature 
of education adminstration amidst ongoing attempts to reshape it. 
Existing structures in education administration 
 
2. The structures that will be affected by the establishment of the 
Education Authority have developed across this period. They comprise 
a structure of education administration developed in a piecemeal 
fashion, one that is the product of augmentation as time has required, 
rather than a single, concerted exercise in planning. 
3. Five Education and Library Boards were established in 1973. Their 
role since has been to: 
 provide a curriculum advisory and support service to all schools in 
their area; 
 provide and administer other services related to schools – e.g. the 
schools’ applications and admissions processes, SEN services, 
appointments to Boards of Governors, milk and meals, materials, 
transport, enforce school attendance, etc; 
 regulate the employment of children and young people and secure 
the provision of youth service facilities; 
 secure the provision of recreation services; 
 award university and other scholarships; 
 employ teaching staff in controlled schools and non-teaching staff in 
most schools; and 
 act as funding authority to most schools and fulfil the role of 
ownership in relation to controlled schools. 
 
4. The Staff Commission for Education and Library Boards is a 
separate organisation created at the same time as the ELBs. Its 
functions are to oversee recruitment, promotion, training and terms and 
conditions of employment for non-teaching staff employed in ELBs. 
5. Also in 1973, the Youth Council for Northern Ireland (YCNI) was 
established under the Recreation and Youth Services (Northern 
Ireland) Order. Its key functions since have included: 
 supporting the development of effective youth policies and quality 
youth work practice;  
 facilitating meaningful collaboration between youth organisations 
and all sectors with responsibility for young people, encouraging 
cross-community activity by the youth service; and 
 advising on the training of part-time and full-time youth workers. 
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6. Council for Catholic Maintained Schools (CCMS): Outside of the 
management and ownership responsibilities of ELBs are a number of 
voluntary schools which are owned and managed by their local 
Trustees. The majority of these schools are voluntary, maintained 
schools owned and managed by Trustees on behalf of the Catholic 
Church.  In order to facilitate the management of these schools, the 
Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, transferred 
responsibility for all Catholic maintained schools to a statutory body, 
the CCMS.  Alongside the ELBs and their functions, CCMS’ seminal 
functions include: 
 to employ all teachers in Catholic maintained schools; 
 to advise the Department or an ELB on matters relating to Catholic 
maintained schools and represents trustees, schools and governors 
on issues such as raising standards, the schools estate, etc; 
 to promote and co-ordinate the planning of the effective provision of 
Catholic maintained schools; and 
 to promote the effective management and control of Catholic 
maintained schools by the boards of governors of such schools. 
 
7. Meanwhile, a minority of voluntary schools that are not maintained 
(including the voluntary grammars) continue to employ their own 
teachers and staff and receive funding direct from DE. When Grant-
Maintained Integrated schools which were established from 1989 these 
also retained these features.  
8. The NI Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment 
(CCEA) was established in 1994. It succeeded the School 
Examinations and Assessment Council in delivering the following 
functions: 
 to keep under review all aspects of the curriculum, examinations 
and assessment for grant aided schools and colleges of further 
education and to undertake statutory consultation on proposals 
relating to legislation; 
 to advise the DE on matters concerned with the curriculum, 
assessment, examinations and external qualifications and accredit 
and approve qualifications; 
 to conduct and moderate examinations and assessments, ensuring 
that standards are recognised as equivalent to standards of 
examinations and assessments conducted by other bodies or 
authorities exercising similar functions in the United Kingdom; 
 to publish and disseminate information relating to the curriculum, 
assessment and examinations; 
 to develop and produce teaching support materials for use in 
schools; and 
 to carry out research and development. 
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9. In this context it is important also to mention two non-statutory bodies, 
NI Council for Integrated Education (NICIE) and Comhairle na 
Gaelscolaíochta (CnaG). NICIE was established in 1987 and since 
1989 has been funded by the Department to support and promote the 
development of integrated education. CnaG was established in 2000, 
since when it has been funded by DE to support and promote the 
development of Irish-medium education. 
The Education and Skills Authority 
10. In education, the Review of Public Adminstration found that the array of 
structures described above represented a case for significant structural 
reform. In response to this, the RPA recommended in 2005 the 
establishment of an Education and Skills Authority: 
 ESA was to be established to focus on the operational delivery of 
educational services.  It would also be involved in the strategic 
planning of the schools’ estate and ensuring delivery of the 
curriculum, including the 14 – 19 curriculum; 
 ESA was to bring together all the direct support functions currently 
undertaken by the ELBs, CCMS, CCEA and the Youth Council.  It 
was also to have responsibility for front-line and related functions 
currently undertaken by NICIE and CnaG; and  
 it was to be the sole employing authority for teachers and support 
staff – for reasons of greater coherence and consistency; 
 meanwhile, DE would continue to be responsible for education 
policy and strategy.  Some of the operational functions currently 
performed by the DE would transfer to ESA. 
11. An Education Bill to establish ESA was introduced during the mandate 
immediately after the restoration of devolution in May 2007. This did 
not complete before the dissolution of that Assembly mandate. In 
November 2011, the First and Deputy First Minister announced a 
renewed commitment to establish ESA – this time minus the 
incorporation of CCEA. A new Education Bill was introduced in October 
2012. In the context of implementation, a Full Business Case for the 
establishment of ESA was submitted by DE to DFP – and received 
approval in June 2013. The objectives that this FBC defined for the 
establishment of ESA are indicative of the scale of reform that it 
represented: 
 To ensure the provision of high quality education that will improve 
educational outcomes for pupils and reduce 
educational underachievement; 
 To foster high quality leadership, teaching and management in the 
education workforce through the provision of employment 
arrangements that support school autonomy and as the provider of 
challenge, development and support services;  
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 To create a single and statutory authority for the area-based 
planning of schools and provision, that gives all pupils access to a 
broad curriculum in sustainable schools and fit-for-purpose facilities; 
 To deliver consistency, equity and improved efficiency in the 
provision of educational services to ensure that they are fit-for-
purpose and maximise value-for-money; 
 To establish a structure of improved and rigorous governance that 
challenges, holds to account and manages the performance of all 
those responsible for the educational experiences of children; and 
 To transform capital procurement to ensure the speedy and cost-
effective delivery of investment in schools and youth services. 
12. The Education Bill, 2012, did not advance beyond its completion of 
Committee Stage on 8 April 2013. Accordingly, in February 2014, the 
Minister of Education announced that he was stopping the programme 
to establish the ESA. On 14 October 2014 the Executive agreed to 
remove from its 2011-15 Programme for Government the commitment 
to establish ESA.  They agreed to replace the 5 ELBs and their Staff 
Commission with one Education Authority. 
Local Government Reform 
13. The central feature of local government reform is the creation of an 11-
council structure for local government, instead of the current model of 
26 councils.  The new 11 councils were broadly defined first in 
accordance with Section 1 of the Local Government Boundaries Act 
(NI) 2008. They were then more specifically defined by the Local 
Government Boundaries Order (NI) 2012 so as to envisage the 
following 11 councils, illustrated at Figure 1.  The red borders define 
the current 26 councils.  The black borders define the new 11 councils. 
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Figure 1: The current 26-Council Model and the 11-Council Model due to 
replace it 
 
14. Article 5 (1) of the Local Government (Boundaries) (2008 Act) 
(Commencement, Transitional Provision and Savings) Order (NI) 2013 
has since provided that 1 April, 2015 shall be the effective date for this 
reform. This shall be the date on which our current 26 councils shall 
dissolve and on which the new 11 councils above come into full effect 
and possession of their powers and functions.  
15. The Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 received Royal 
Assent on 12 May 2014, and provides the legislative framework for 
Northern Ireland’s 11 new councils: how decisions shall be made, how 
positions of responsibility are shared across political parties, how 
improvements in the delivery of council functions can be achieved to 
reflect the needs of local communities, and how effectively and 
efficiently council services are delivered to people. It provides for 
“Community Planning” - a framework within which Councils, 
departments, statutory bodies and other relevant agencies and sectors 
can work together to develop and implement a shared vision for 
promoting the economic, social and environmental well-being of their 
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area based on effective engagement with the community. It provides 
also for strong, modern, statutory governance in Councils and 
introduces a new ethical standards framework which includes a 
mandatory code of conduct for councillors. 
16. For much of the duration of this long reform programme, its 
compatibility with the structures of education administration has not 
been an issue. This is because from November 2011 until relatively 
recently, the Department of Education has been pursuing the 
establishment of the Education and Skills Authority (ESA) – as set out 
above. ESA was to be the single, regional body responsible for all 
education administration - established ahead of the new 11 councils. Its 
regional level governance and responsibilities would have transcended 
any issue of compatibility with the new model of 11 councils. 
Compatibility would have merely required certain administrative 
arrangements within ESA to be ready for 1 April 2015. 
The need for structural reform 
17. With its own delivery in sight, therefore, local government reform now 
poses the question of how education administration shall be compatible 
with it. For if ESA shall not replace them, the largest structures within 
the current landscape of education administration shall remain. The 
ELBs are defined by the unreformed structures of local government. 
Article 3 of the Education and Libraries (NI) Order 1986 provides that 
there shall be five ELBs. It also provides that the territorial 
responsibilities of each shall be defined by groupings of local 
government districts – as is then set down in the related Schedule 1 of 
the 1986 Order (see Annex VIII). This lists each of our current 26 
council districts opposite the ELB which will be responsible for that 
district – effectively creating and defining the Belfast, Western, North-
Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern ELBs.  
18. Unless these arrangements are changed, therefore, after 1 April, 2015, 
the territorial responsibilities of our ELBs shall be defined by reference 
to local government districts that are, from that date, defunct. The ELBs 
will no longer be able to draw their political membership from councils 
that are coterminous with their territorial responsibilities. Ambitions for 
community planning will face significant difficulties. More 
fundamentally, in legal and therefore sustainable terms, this would be a 
proposal for education administration too fragile ever to be preferred. 
19. This is why some structural change is needed.  A proposal of the scale 
of ESA in policy and reform terms is not required. There is no need 
presented by local government reform to look at reforming structures 
that it does not affect, ie. CCMS, the Youth Council, CCEA, NICIE and 
CnaG. If the continuation of these organisations in the absence of ESA 
requires changes to them, these may be the subject of separate 
business cases. For this FBC, the necessary assumption in respect of 
these organisations is that they shall remain and continue to perform 
their established functions.  
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20. Then in respect of the structures that local government reform does 
affect – the ELBs – there is no particular need to change role and 
functions. The issues that need addressing due to local government 
reform are not whether we need to change what the ELBs do. What is 
needed are arrangements that make them fit, in terms of territorial 
responsibility and governance, with the new 11 councils.   
The Education Authority 
21. It is in recognition of this that the Minister has proposed the 
establishment of a single Education Authority. For reasons that this 
FBC will develop, he considers this to be the most efficient and 
effective way of reshaping education administration given the 
imperative to do so presented by local government reform. On 25 
September 2014, the Executive agreed to withdraw its RPA–affiliated 
commitment to establish ESA and agreed instead to legislate for the 
establishment of the Education Authority in place of the 5 ELBs and 
their Staff Commission. 
22. The proposal for an Education Authority is as follows: The Education 
Bill 2014 will establish a single body – the Education Authority - to 
subsume the functions, assets and liabilities of 6 bodies: the 5 
Education and Library Boards and their Staff Commission; 
 Transfer Schemes developed in accordance with the Education Bill 
shall transfer the staff of dissolving organisations to the employment 
of the Education Authority. This will establish the Education 
Authority’s in-scope workforce (of approximately 2,400 at this point) 
under a senior management structure (outlined in Chapter 5).  
 
 The Department of Education will retain policy responsibility for 
education.  The Education Authority will undertake the same 
operational functions as currently performed by the 5 ELBs, in 
accordance with the provisions of the various Education Orders – 
unchanged except for amendment to apply instead to the Education 
Authority.  (During the passage of the Bill the Assembly decided 
that the Education Authority should also have duties to promote 
shared education (subject to Commencement Order) and the 
community use of school premises.) 
 
23. Change, therefore, should be minimal – the concerns of the legislation 
and implementation should primarily be structural and technical 
compliance with local government reforms.  Being a regional body, the 
Education Authority’s territorial responsibilities would contain all 11 
local government authorities.  Its governance-links to political 
representation would also be at Assembly level – not local council 
level. To work with the new councils – for instance in terms of 
Community Planning – will simply require certain administrative 
arrangements.  
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24.  New policy is however required for the proposed arrangements for 
governance and constitution within the Education Authority.1 These 
cannot be the same as arrangements that have operated since 1986 in 
the 5 sub-regional ELBs with links to 26 councils – defunct after 1 April, 
2015.  To maintain arrangements from 1986 in the face of modern, best 
practice would be curious and perverse. Hence, the proposed 
governance and constitution arrangements of the Education Authority 
are not like those of an ELB. They are reminiscent of those which 
would have been established for ESA, and also the modern and best-
practice arrangements provided for in many recently created NDPBs.  
A compact membership of 21 including a DE-appointed Chair, a 
political membership of 8 established by reference to party strengths in 
the assembly, 4 members representative of the interests of the 
Transferors, 4 members representative of the interests of Trustees and 
1 member each representative the interests of Integrated Schools, 
Voluntary Grammar schools, Controlled Grammar schools and Irish 
medium schools. 
25. The overall effect is the creation of an organisation that is a regional 
version of an ELB – different from an ELB only in scale, in modernised 
and regionalised governance and constitutional arrangements, and by 
the long overdue removal from its title of the anachronistic reference to 
library-related responsibilities. In other words, the reform is structural 
and technical, the minimum required by the imperative for structural 
change presented by local government reform. 
The Financial context 
26. The outcome of Budget 2011-15 produced major challenges for 
education. The level of funding for the period 2011/12 to 2014/15 is 
less than had previously been in place, creating significant shortfalls 
against the Department’s anticipated spending requirements – initially 
some £101m / £187m / £229m / £306m across the 4 year Budget 
period.  A Savings Delivery Plan was developed to address the gap in 
funding.  The savings measures within this plan seek to: 
 protect spend on Departmental priorities;  
 bear down on unnecessary bureaucracy; and  
 protect, as far as possible, funding for frontline services.    
27. In the interim, the Minister has agreed a revised Savings Delivery Plan.  
The most significant changes have been the announcement by the 
Minister on 17 November 2011 that he was reallocating an additional 
£10m / £15m / £15m into the Aggregated Schools Budget (ASB) in 
                                                     
1
 It should be noted that to address the long established and long-recognised deficit in representation for 
Controlled Schools, the Minister’s proposal to establish an Education Authority extends also to a 
proposal to fund a body to enhance support, and advocate, for this sector. This shall be the subject of a 
separate business case. 
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2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 respectively and his further 
announcement on 12 January 2012 that additional funding of £30m / 
£15m / £75m over the period 2012/13 to 2014/15 was also to be 
allocated directly to schools. The latest revision of the Savings Delivery 
Plan now seeks to address shortfalls of £147m, £176m and £206m in 
2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 respectively.2  
28. The savings required by the Savings Delivery Plan from the 
administration budgets of the Department’s Arms Length Bodies 
(ALBs) across 2011-15 (£15m/ £15.3m/ £15.3m/ £15.3m) have 
removed from education administration the scope for the savings that 
ESA was anticipated to deliver in both its OBC and FBC. A further 
£15m of savings was identified from the Professional Support for 
Schools budget for 2011/12, rising to £25m per year for 2012/13, 
2013/14 and 2014/15.  
29. To contribute to the Savings Delivery Plan, and in expectation that ESA 
would make rationalisation sustainable, some 414 voluntary severance 
arrangements have taken place in the ELBs and their Staff 
Commission.  Meanwhile, whilst some corresponding development of 
regionally managed services has been attempted, it has been hindered 
by uncertainty. The result of this is that education services in 2015 
remain delivered largely as they were before despite large-scale 
reductions in the workforce. Restructuring is now needed to make 
education administration sustainable in the light of savings already 
banked. Failing that, restoration of existing structures is required. 
Conclusion: the case for restructuring  
30. If we do not change the current structures of our ELBs, then from 1 
April, 2015 they will enter into a relationship with local councils that was 
not intended and will, in law, provide too fragile a basis for education 
administration than could ever be preferred. The long-term 
sustainability of the basic functionality of the ELBs requires that they 
urgently be reshaped into a structure or structures that are compatible 
with the new local councils. The financial context would argue for the 
form of restructuring that also achieves the greatest level of efficiency.  
 
                                                     
2
 The Saving Delivery Plan is available on the DE website at 
http://www.deni.gov.uk/budget_2011-
15__savings_delivery_plan_for_the_department_of_education.pdf 
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CHAPTER 3: OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS  
Introduction 
1. This chapter outlines the aims, objectives and constraints which will 
underpin the quantitative and qualitative evaluation of options for the 
establishment of the Education Authority – and the approach to 
benefits realisation that is outlined in Chapter 9. These reflect the 
principle of minimalism as has been emphasised in Chapter 2. 
2. Aim: the overall aim for the establishment of the Education Authority is 
to ensure that, amidst local government reform, education 
administration operates efficiently and effectively to support the delivery 
of education-related Programme for Government commitments, 
Ministerial priorities, statutory functions and (overarching) educational 
services to children and young people. 
3. The specific objectives to support delivery of this aim have been 
identified as follows: 
 To provide an administrative structure that is compatible with the 
new 11 council model of local government; and 
 To maintain the delivery of services currently provided by the 
Education and Library Boards and the drive always to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of those services. 
4. These reflect the aim – which is compatibility with local government. 
They incorporate the pursuit of improvements because that surely is 
part of the status quo.  
5. Constraints: the principal constraints which will apply to the 
establishment of the Education Authority, and the alternatives to it as 
assessed in this FBC, have been identified as follows: 
 Time – the target date of April 2015 is challenging. It requires 
preparatory work on implementation to proceed in tandem with 
legislation. It will mean “steady state” is achieved some years after 
structural change.  
 Legislation – primary legislation is required for any future structural 
model that is not 5 ELBs. Such primary legislation must progress 
via Accelerated Passage to complete and facilitate implementation 
for 1 April, 2015. Secondary legislation would be needed for a 5-
ELB-model that was legally compliant with the new 11 councils.  
 Funding - The provision of education and support services by the 
Education Authority or its alternatives must be deliverable within the 
budget allocation and front-loaded costs must be secured within the 
Education Budget. 
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 Location – After structural change, the design and delivery of the 
functions currently performed by the ELBs should, as appropriate, 
take into account the Government’s position on location and 
dispersal, following a detailed Equality Impact Assessment.  This 
will be a matter for the Board of the Authority, which will wish to 
ensure that it is accessible to the schools and communities that it 
serves.  For the purpose of this FBC, however, it has been 
assumed that the Education Authority will operate from a single 
headquarters location but will be a regional organisation with a 
strong local presence. 
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CHAPTER 4: OPTIONS – LONG-LIST AND SHORT-LIST 
Introduction 
1. This chapter outlines the options in respect of the structural reform of 
the ELBs that is needed due to the imperative that is presented by local 
government reforms that take effect on 1 April, 2015. These options are 
then shortlisted according to the manner in which they would fulfil the 
objectives set out in Chapter 3. 
2. In identifying these options the financial aspect of the strategic context 
is important. Chapter 2 gave an account of DE’s Savings Delivery Plan. 
It explained that as part of this plan, some 414 voluntary severance 
arrangements have taken place in the bodies that would be affected by 
the structural changes required to achieve compatibility with local 
government reform. The establishment of ESA was intended to make 
structures sustainable in the light of these reductions. However, in the 
absence of ESA, those bodies are now in a depleted  and 
unsustainable state. Only options which rationalise or reboot (i.e. which 
return staff to sustainable levels that pre-date those 414 voluntary 
severances that were predicated on ESA) may therefore achieve both 
objectives: 
 To provide an administrative structure that is compatible with the 
new 11 council model of local government; and 
 To maintain the delivery of services currently provided by the 
Education and Library Boards and the drive always to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of those services. 
We realise however that rebooting the Education and Library Board 
back to the 2008 baseline figure is unrealistic in this financial climate.  
The 2008 baseline figures are therefore used for comparative reasons. 
3. At long-list stage, therefore, we consider there to be three “status 
quo” options – i.e. options which continue existing structures in varying 
forms: 
 Option 1: Do nothing: leave the ELBs with their existing territory 
despite the fact that this will (1) lack adequate legal definition; and  
(2) weaken their governance arrangements. Do not increase their 
staffing levels leaving them and their Staff Commission, in terms of 
staff depletion, continuing to operate at the extremities of corporate 
risk; 
 Option 2: Status Quo (Rebooted): as per Option 1 – but 
increasing their staffing levels to pre-voluntary severance levels. 
 Option 3: Status Quo (Reconfigured and Rebooted) pursue the 
legislation necessary to create new boundaries for the 5 ELBs that 
are coterminous with the new 11 councils; pursue a range of inter-
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ELB change programmes to transfer staff, assets, responsibilities 
and liabilities as required by the boundary changes; and  increase 
staffing levels to pre-voluntary severance levels. 
4. There are then the following options which envisage the creation of 
new structures: 
 Option 4: Reduce to fewer ELBs: pursue the legislation necessary 
to create fewer ELBs that are coterminous with the new 11 councils; 
pursue a range of inter-ELB change programmes to transfer staff, 
assets, responsibilities and liabilities as required by the changes. 
Establish staffing levels according to the level of rationalisation that 
may be achieved and the level of “re-booting” that may otherwise be 
required. This will depend on how few ELBs will be achieved under 
this option: 
o Option 4 (a) – four ELBs: this will require primary legislation 
and a range of change programmes, but has the least scope 
to effect rationalisation; 
o Option 4 (b) – three ELBs: as per Option 4a but with 
greater scope for rationalisation; 
o Option 4 (c) – two ELBs: as per Option 4b but with greater 
scope for rationalisation; 
o Option 4(d): Establish the Education Authority: this is 
Option 4 taken to its maximum degree – a single ELB – but 
which also recognises that the appropriate term, in which 
case, would be “authority”; and which also recognises that 
the reference to “libraries” within the statutory name of the 
ELB has, since the creation of the NILA, been an 
anachronism. This option will require primary legislation, and 
a large change programme to transfer all ELBs’ staff, assets, 
responsibilities and liabilities to the new authority. This option 
has a greater scope for rationalisation than any of the options 
above. As shall be shown, this option has scope for 
rationalisation comparable in scale to the establishment of 
ESA. 
 Option 5: Abolish the ELBs and centralise their functions 
within DE: This option integrates the in scope functions within the 
Department resulting in an increase in the DE size by over 45,000 
staff. Within this option the existing organisations would be 
dissolved, and efficiencies could be realised through rationalising 
managerial functions and corporate service functions.  Governance 
and accountability would be delivered through the Departmental 
Board and associated management structures. 
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5. The table below sifts the options according to how they score against 
the objectives. The scoring ratings are from 0 to 6 – with 0 denoting the 
minimal score and 6 the maximum. 
 Objective 1 
 
Objective 2 
 
Comments Shortlist 
Option 1: Do 
Nothing 
0 0 This will maintain structures that reflect 
the defunct 26 councils and will continue 
to leave ELBs operating at the 
extremities of corporate risk 
Yes (as a 
baseline) 
Option 2: Reboot 0 1 This will maintain structures that reflect 
the defunct 26 councils but will restore 
staffing levels to a sustainable position. 
However, maintaining 5 separate 
organisations on a weakened legislative 
basis promises only to maintain service 
delivery and with the least efficiency. 
No 
Option 3: 
Reconfigure and 
Reboot 
6 2 This will amend existing structures to 
align with the new 11-council model of 
local government and will restore staffing 
levels to a sustainable position. 
Effectiveness is better than Option 2 but 
5 organisations would be less efficient 
and more expensive to run than numbers 
reflected under Option 4a 
Yes 
Option 4: Reduce 
to fewer ELBs 
a- 4 ELBs 
b- 3 Elbs 
c- 2 ELBs 
d- Establish 
the 
Education 
Authority 
 
6 
6 
6 
6 
 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
Scoring here reflects that legislation will 
make the reduced number of ELBs 
(whatever it is) equally compatible with 
the new 11-council model. It then reflects 
the fact that greater rationalisation and a 
concerted drive on performance 
becomes increasingly achievable the 
more one reduces the number of 
organisations. 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Option 5: 
Centralise ELB 
functions in DE 
6 1 This option has the potential to realise 
significant rationalisation – but it merges 
policy, strategy and operations in a 
manner that is typically contrary to good 
practice, expertise, strong performance 
and accountability.  
No 
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6. The two highest scoring options, Option 3 and 4(d) comprise the short 
list.  There is little benefit in exploring the range of options under Option 
4 – fewer ELBs – in a monetary assessment. Replacing 5 organisations 
with 1, the Education Authority, will self-evidently be a more 
rationalising structural change than replacing 5 organisations with the 
intervening numerical options. It is also intuitively correct that the 
monetary assessment should be between an option which continues 
with existing structures and the ultimate form of the alternative – 
wholesale structural change to create one organisation instead.  
7. Option 1 has been obtained to provide a baseline, although this is not a 
realistic option and not a fair point of counterfactual reference. The 
ELBs are currently in a state where structural rationalisation will not so 
much release efficiencies as make them sustainable in the light of 
efficiencies already made. The efficiencies of structural rationalisation 
have been “banked” in advance. The counterfactual to structural 
rationalisation, therefore, is its opposite, not inaction. The closest thing 
available to a true counterfactual in the current context would be 
returning the ELBs to their levels of staff pre-voluntary severance and 
recreating the links to local councils which will otherwise lapse on 1 
April, 2015. This is Option 3 v Option 4(d), exactly as shortlisted. 
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CHAPTER 5: MONETARY ASSESSMENT AND NET PRESENT COST 
Introduction 
1.This chapter provides a detailed appraisal of the monetary costs and 
benefits associated with each of the two shortlisted options. Importantly 
it indicates how costs and benefits have been identified and the main 
sources and assumptions used. The information presented in this 
chapter is supported by a detailed financial model (summaries included 
at Annex II). 
2.The monetary assessment at the heart of the FBC for ESA was a 
comparison between the costs of: 
 establishing ESA and rationalising the central workforces of the 5 
ELBs, their Staff Commission, the Youth Council (YCNI) and the 
Council for Catholic Maintained Schools (CCMS); and 
 the counterfactual: not establishing ESA - and maintaining, and 
restoring to levels that pre-date large-scale voluntary severance 
programmes, the 5 ELBs, their Staff Commission, CCMS and YCNI.  
3. The policy context is  very different to the proposal to establish the 
Education and Skills Authority; however, the proposals to establish the 
Education Authority must be the subject of a very similar monetary 
assessment. This business case articulates the response to an external 
event with a defined date and a known impact – the reorganisation of 
local government effective from 1 April 2015. The Education Authority 
workforce will be a rationalised amalgamation of the in-scope 
workforces of the 5 ELBs and their Staff Commission. At the point of 
the baseline adopted for the Education Authority FBC (September 
2014), all of the 2,431 in-scope workforce within the 6 organisations to 
be either subsumed into EA (Option 4(d)) or rebooted (Option 3), were 
in the 5 ELBs and their Staff Commission. In these terms, creating an 
Education Authority out of the 5 ELBs and their Staff Commission, or 
rebooting these organisations, can each be thought of as 
approximately 97% of the two options monetarily assessed in the ESA 
FBC.  
Scope of monetary assessment: 
4.The purpose of this monetary assessment is to assess the value for 
money of moving to a single Education Authority from 2015 – “Option 
4(d) (Establish the Education Authority)” as set out in Chapter 4. This 
assessment is provided by comparing this option in monetary terms 
with “Option 3 (Status Quo: (Reconfigure and Rebooted))” – the 
reconfiguration of the current 5 ELB boundaries in line with new local 
Council areas from 26 to 11, and the “rebooting” in staffing terms of 
these organisations and their Staff Commission. Rebooting is taken to 
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mean returning the workforce to the level that pre-dates the workforce 
reductions made in anticipation of ESA.   
5.The ESA FBC assessed the baseline funding position with regard to the 
consolidation of funding and services within ESA. This FBC likewise 
assumes that the baseline funding position wider than this (i.e. in terms 
of schools and Youth Resource DEL and capital grant) will remain 
constant regardless of which option is delivered. These costs have 
therefore not been included. Instead this FBC focuses on the delivery 
model for the education system in NI and assesses the costs and 
benefits of the two delivery models (Option 3 and Option 4(d)).  
6. As per the ESA FBC, no attempt is made to assess a monetary value 
for educational outcomes.  These rather form part of the non-monetary 
assessment. Therefore no monetary benefits are explicitly considered 
in this chapter, only costs. The decision rule for selecting the preferred 
option in monetary terms is to select the option with the lowest NPC. 
7.In-scope monetary costs: the monetary costs considered in scope of 
this FBC relate to: 
 Costs directly attributable to non-teaching, non-schools based staff 
that provide services and support to schools, including salaries and 
an approximation of associated non staff costs; and 
 Costs associated with the implementation of both options, including: 
o Change management and delivery; 
o Recruitment and selection;  
o Redundancy payments; and 
o Re-branding. 
 
8.Appraisal period: for the purposes of the FBC we have selected a time 
horizon of 10 years from the base year of 2015/16. This will allow for 
capture of the relevant costs of Options 3 and 4(d) from 2015 or as 
soon as possible thereafter. It will also allow for scope to examine any 
differential impact in both options by their respective achievement of 
“steady state” before 2026. The base year for the monetary appraisal is 
2014/15 and all costs are stated in April 2014 prices unless otherwise 
stated and are exclusive of VAT. All costs and benefits prior to April 
2014 are considered ‘sunk’ and not relevant to this monetary appraisal. 
9.The basis for costs and benefits is well defined. A number of important 
assumptions, however, have still had to be made given that the 
realisation of future costs and benefits is necessarily forward-looking. 
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Cost definition and assumptions 
10. Staff Costs: the staffing costs for both options are made with 
reference to a full-time equivalent (FTE) staff baseline figure for 
September 2014. 
11. In accordance with the assumptions within the ESA FBC, the staffing 
posts included within this FBC refer to non-teaching, non-schools 
based staff. The detailed figure-work in relation to these is set out in 
Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: staffing numbers  
 Grade  FTE Posts 
 
2008:  
5 ELBs 
and 
SCELB 
Baseline: 
Sept 
2014: 5 
ELBs and 
SCELB 
 
Option 3: 
(Status Quo 
(Reconfigured 
and 
Rebooted)) 
Option 
4(d): 
(Establish 
the 
Education 
Authority) 
Senior 
Management  
90 52 77 22 
Middle 
Management/ 
Professions  
739 553 739 551 
Supervisory 
Management  
1598 1289 1598 1271 
Clerical and 
Support  
612 537 612 582 
Total  3,039 2431 3,026 2,426 
 
Notes: 
1. The grade groupings above are the combination of several “Comparative Grades”.   
2. Rebooted option has been returned to the 2008 adjusted baseline figures for those categories 
below Senior Management.  
3. Figures given for rebooting of Senior Management is in comparison with the original figure 
given before adjusted. 
 
12. Definitions/explanations of these figures and assumptions are as 
follows: 
 2008: 5 ELBs and SCELB: this is the number of in-scope FTE staff 
in these organisations before this number was reduced by voluntary 
severances.3   
                                                     
3
 The 3039 is calculated as follows: the ESA FBC identified 3152 as the number of in-scope staff in the 
5 ELBs, CCMS, YCNI & SCELB. For this FBC, 113 should be deducted from that 3152 figure 
because it includes 113 staff who were employed in the YCNI and CCMS in April 2008 (according to 
the 2007/8 Annual reports of the CCMS and YCNI). Staff in these organisations are not in-scope in this 
FBC. The breakdown of 3039 according to the four categories – Senior Management/ Middle 
Management/ Supervisory Management/ Clerical and Support - is arrived at by deducting the 113 
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 Baseline: September 2014: 5 ELBs and SCELB: the number of 
in- scope FTE staff in these organisations after reductions through 
voluntary severance to April 14.4 
 Option 3 (Status Quo (Reconfigured and Rebooted)): The 
figures for this option assume a return from the September 2014 
baseline to the 2008 levels. The “rebooting” is necessary in order to 
make sustainable the continuation of delivery by disparate 
organisations. As highlighted in Table 5.1, while option 3 is 
presented as the staffing profile that would arise as a result of 
bringing the workforce back to the point before any staff depletion 
occurred, it has been recognised that the ability to do so fully may 
be constrained in practice, particularly at senior management level. 
It has been assumed that the total number of senior management 
staff under this option would therefore be less than existed in the 
2008 baseline – that is, 77 rather than 90.  
 Option 4(d) (Establish the Education Authority): the figures 
reflect the anticipated staffing profile of the Education Authority in 
steady-state.  Figures for Senior Management reflect the current 
nature of plans for the Senior Management Structure of the 
Education Authority, which will deliver further savings from the 
September 2014 baseline5.  The ESA FBC assumed that due to  
the reduced processing requirements of one organisation when set 
against eight, 10% savings would be made from an April 2012 
baseline6. Reducing the ELBs and their staff commission into the 
Education Authority must have the same potential.  Figures for 
Middle Management, Supervisory Management and Clerical and 
Support grades reflect this and a further reduction has been made 
in light of the more constrained role of the Education Authority when 
                                                                                                                                                        
proportionately from the figure given for each category within the ESA FBC and reduction of 13 
Senior Managers Posts. 
4
 ESAIT maintain figures which detail how the 414 voluntary severances in the 5 ELBs (412) and 
SCELB (2) breakdown in terms of four categories– Senior Management (18) Middle Management 
(145.64) Supervisory Management (153) Clerical and Support (98). As a result of the failure to secure 
political agreement on the Education Bill the Minister announced in February 2014 that he was 
stopping all work to establish the ESA. Vacancy control placed on all categories with the exception of 
Clerical and Support staff was not lifted, which saw a further reduction in staffing levels through 
natural wastage at the three top levels, namely: Senior Management (7) Middle Management (41) 
Supervisory Management (156).  There was however, a slight increase (23) in staff within the Clerical 
and Support grades.  These figures inclusive of staff that left under Voluntary Severance deducted from 
the 2008 figures provide the 2014 baseline figure.   
5
 The Education Authority senior structures are not yet finalised but necessarily draw on ELB senior 
management structures - and the manner in which ESA planned senior managers (5) for sub-regional 
areas. According to this, a structure of CEO and 4 directorates with 17 area Directors implies a total of 
22 senior managers. 
6
 The ESA FBC envisaged that the establishment of ESA would allow for a ‘grouping of services’ into 
discrete regional based delivery units which in conjunction with a single ICT platform should allow for 
processing efficiencies and the need for reduced staff numbers. Empirical evidence from other UK 
public sector organisations identifies average headcount savings from collaborative or shared service 
arrangements at 13%.  The 10% target set for ESA was recognised at the low end of the scale, however 
was deemed appropriate given the efficiencies already achieved.  
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compared to ESA7.  The planning assumption is therefore for an 
overall reduction of 13% at all grades below Senior Management 
compared to the April 2012 staffing levels provided in the ESA 
FBC.8  
  
13.The salary cost of the relevant non- teaching, non-schools based staff 
who are in the scope of this exercise is approximately £66.9 million. 
This is based upon a total staff complement of 2,431 as at the baseline 
of September 2014.  This cost excludes employer costs i.e. National 
Insurance contributions and pension contributions. A summary of the 
total staffing complement and associated cost is presented in Table 
5.2. 
Table 5.2: total staff complement and cost of baseline and options9 
Grades  
Base 
line: 
Posts 
Baseline
: Cost 
(£000) 
Option 
3: 
Posts 
Option  
3: 
Cost  
(£000) 
Option 
4(d): 
Posts 
Option 
4(d): 
 Cost 
(£000) 
Senior 
Management  
 
52 
 
3618 
 
77 
 
5,357 
 
22 
 
1531 
Middle 
Management 
 
553 
 
24,514 
 
739 
 
32,760 
 
551 
 
24,426 
Supervisory 
Management  
 
1289 
 
31,310 
 
1598 
 
38,815 
 
1,271 
 
30,873 
Clerical and 
Support  
 
537 
 
7,437 
 
612 
 
8,476 
 
582 
 
8061 
Total 
 
2431 
 
66,879 
 
3026 
 
85,408 
 
2426 
 
64,891 
Notes 
1. The grade groupings above are the combination of several “Comparative Grades”.  
2.  Cost of Reboot & the Education Authority options have been derived through pro-rating 
the   baseline at April 2014 costs i.e. based on the average cost per grade. 
 
                                                     
7
 While the Education Authority will have an important role in raising standards and in area-based 
planning, the former Education Bill (2012) would have empowered ESA to lead school improvement 
and the area-planning of schools – and ESA would have been structured to make best use of these 
statutory powers.  It would also have conferred additional duties on ESA in relation to child protection 
and schools’ schemes of management and employment.  While it is intended that the Education 
Authority will be designated as a Centre of Procurement Expertise (CoPE), ESA would have served as 
the CoPE for the whole of the education sector.  
8
 The figures given for the Middle Management, Supervisory Management and Clerical and Support 
grades of the Education Authority are calculated as follows. There were to be 652 middle management, 
1504 supervisory management, and 689 clerical and support in in-scope organisations in April 2012 
according to the ESA FBC. Adjusted to exclude (proportionately) the 84 staff who were employed by 
the CCMS and YCNI in April 2012 (according to the 2011/12 annual reports), and then reduced by 
13% these figures are 551, 1271 and 582 respectively.   
9
 Table 5.2 has been derived from Table 5.2 in the ESA FBC through the following calculations. We 
have uplifted the salaries contained in the ESA FBC to take account of a 0.7% increase for pay 
progression to a higher spine point for years 13/14 and 14/15 along with a further 1% pay award for 
13/14. A combined 2.4% has therefore been added to the ESA FBC salary costs to determine the 2014 
baseline costs.  
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14.Table 5.2 suggests that there is minimal difference in terms of overall 
staff numbers between the current baseline and the EA scenario, 
particularly outside of Senior Management grades. At Clerical and 
Support grade level, in fact, it is estimated that an additional 45 staff 
will be needed to implement the EA.  
15.It is important to consider, however, what the impact has been of a 
protracted period of vacancy control on Board operations.  The scope 
for 13% reductions against April 2012 levels has already disappeared 
in terms of clerical and support staff due to the numbers of voluntary 
severance, retirements and resignations since April 2012.  The number 
of workers at these grades in the current baseline is in fact some 20% 
below the April 2012 baseline used in the ESA FBC (adjusted to 
remove out-of-scope organisations). 
16.In the ESA FBC, the number of staff at Clerical and Support grades 
requried for the implementation of ESA was estimated to be 620.  As 
Table 5.2 shows, the number now estimated as being requried for the 
EA is 582.  This represents a further 6% reduction compared to the 
ESA FBC.  It is therefore considered unrealistic to expect that any staff 
savings beyond this level could be sustained at these grades.  Without 
the additional staff proposed to implement the EA, the organisation 
would remain dangerously depleted and would continue, as Boards do 
now, to operate at the margins of corporate risk.  This scenario is not 
one that is sustainable.   
17.Additions to Table 5.2 costs: in addition we need to uplift the 2014 
baseline salary costs to take account of employer costs, including 
National Insurance and pension contributions (29%). As the base year 
of this FBC is 2015/16 a further uplift has been applied to take account 
of a 1% pay award and staff progression to higher spine points from 
April 2014. A combined uplift of 30.7% should be applied to account for 
these.  
18.A final uplift should then be applied to take account of directly 
attributable non staff costs such as lighting, heating, furniture, 
stationery etc. We have assumed an uplift of 10 per cent for non staff 
costs. This is a notional cost and so will be included for NPC purposes 
only but not for an assessment of affordability.  
19.This gives a total staff cost of approximately £96 million for the 
baseline position. A breakdown of this and the equivalent costs for 
Options 3 and 4(d) are set out in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: derivation of in-scope proportion of DE allocation 
Cost Item 
Baseline Cost 
(£000)  
Option 3: 
Cost (£000)  
Option 
4(d): Cost 
(£000)  
Unadjusted staff 
salaries 66,879 85,408 
 
64,891 
 
Add employer costs 
and wage inflation @ 
30.7% 
 
20,532 
 
26,220 
 
19,922 
Add non staff costs @ 
10%  
 
8,741 
 
11,163 
 
8,481 
Total 96,152 122,791 93,294 
 
20.Option 3: Staff phasing: the current policy intention is to implement 
the Education Authority on 1 April 2015. For the purposes of the FBC 
we have assumed the staffing levels will remain as per the existing 
baseline for the first six months of 2015/16, and the new staffing 
structure under either option will begin to take effect from September 
2015.  
21.Under Option 3 it is assumed that the increase in staffing levels will 
occur over a three year period.  The phasing profile is based upon the 
ESA FBC and previous experience of the timescales involved with the 
recruitment of staff. Full detail on the assumed increase to staff 
numbers is outlined in Table 5.4a.  
Table 5.4a: assumed staffing profile – Option 3 (Reconfigure and 
Reboot) 
Grades  
1 Apr 
2015 - 31 
Aug 2015 
1 Sept 
2015 - 31 
Mar 2016 
1 Apr 
2016 -  31 
Aug 2016 
1 Sept 
2016 - 31 
Mar 2017 
1 Apr 
2017 
onwards 
  Posts 
Senior 
Management  
 
52 
 
58 
 
63 
 
70 
 
77 
Middle 
Management/ 
Professions  
 
553 
 
583 
 
623 
 
663 
 
739 
Supervisory 
Management  
 
1289 
 
1339 
 
1420 
 
1520 
 
1598 
Clerical and 
Support  
 
537 
 
540 
 
560 
 
685 
 
612 
Total  
 
2431 
 
2520 
 
2666 
 
2939 
 
3026 
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22.Option 3: Change management and delivery costs of Option 3: 
Analysis has shown that around 17% of services and workforce within 
each ELB will transfer laterally to the adjoining ELB. The basis for this 
is the work that has shown that under minimal reconfiguration required 
to align the ELBs with the new local councils, some 170 schools (15% 
of the schools’ estate) will move from one ELB to another.  
23.The work to deliver inter-ELB transfers of functions, assetts, staff, 
liabilities of these proportions will require a change management office, 
inclusive of a Director, located within DE,  along with smaller change 
management offices within each of the ELBs.  
24.Table 5.4b provides a breakdown of the costs of these arrangements 
alongside the other types of costs that the changes would incur. These 
reflect the assumptions (1) that the change programme’s central office, 
within DE, would have the same costs of the change managment office 
that was assumed for ESA and (2) that the costs of each ELB-based 
office would be two-thirds of the central office. They also reflect the 
assumption that the complex work of reconfiguration amidst a large-
scale restoration of staffing levels would take 4 years, with the costs 
reducing in the latter two years.  
25.It is obviously anticipated that some staff may be required to relocate 
during the change programme and many of their terms of employment 
provide for relocation costs and/or excess fares for a period of up to 
three years.  Clearly, there is potential for greater movement of staff 
under Option 3.  A location strategy for the Education Authority has yet 
to be developed but the new regional organisation will necessarily 
retain a strong sub-regional presence drawing as much as is practical 
on the existing footprint. 
26.A minimum reconfiguration of the 5 boards to be coterminous with the 
11 Local Councils would impact on circa 17%10 of the central based 
ELB staff.  Staff would be offered a choice to move with the role or stay 
in the current location and be subject to a role change.  Of the c. 413 
staff it is assumed that in the absence of single ICT systems, 80% of 
staff would be affected with an average return distance of 60 miles 
between ELB HQs and using the civil service travel rates of £0.45 for 
190 days per annum – the cost of excess fares for the initial 3 years 
would be circa £1.7m each year. 
27.Option 3 will mean that many of the staff efficiencies already realised 
will need to be reversed. Under this ‘reboot’, it is assumed that staffing 
levels will need to return to 2008, pre-RPA levels in order to sustain 
delivery. 595 new staff would need to be recruited. It is assumed that 
the recruitment and selection of these staff will occur over a two year 
period, September 2015 to September 2017. Given the scale involved, 
it is also assumed that processes will be managed and delivered by an 
external recruitment team. An indicative cost of £200k per full year has 
                                                     
10
 Indications of the optimum 5 Board to 5 Board reconfiguration identified an impact of c. 17%.  
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been included within the costs of the Reconfiguration and Rebooting 
option to provide for all activities associated with recruitment and 
selection.  
 
Table 5.4b: Option 3 (Reconfigure and Reboot) - Change management 
and delivery costs  
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Total 
 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23 £'000 
Change 
Management 
offices within 
the 5 ELBs  
and 1 DE 2,600 2,600 2,000 600 - - - - 7,800 
Excess Fares 850 1,700 1,700 850 0 0 0 0 
    
5,100      
Recruitment 
Unit 200 200 200         600 
Total 3,650 4,500 
 
3,900 1,450 0 0 0 0 
       
13,500    
 
28.Option 4(d): Staff Phasing: this option envisages a reduction in staff 
numbers, with some early savings in senior management due to 
restructuring and consolidation (30 posts). The reduction of 30 Senior 
Management posts represents a restructuring of 1st, 2nd and 3rd tiers of 
the affected legacy organisations, resulting in 22 posts remaining.  
29.As was modelled within the ESA FBC, efficiencies through 
collaborative processing (equivalent to 10% of the April 2012 levels of 
all grades below Senior Management) should then follow, with a further 
reduction of 3% reflecting the more constrained role of the Education 
Authority when compared to ESA (see para 12 above). 
30.Scope for 13% reductions against April 2012 levels has already 
disappeared in terms of clerical and support staff due to the numbers of 
voluntary severance, retirements and resignations since April 2012. 
Completing the 13% reduction on April 2012 levels is, therefore, net of 
some assumed recruitment of clerical and support staff (see paras 14-
16 above). 
31.The assumed profile of staff for Option 2 is outlined in Table 5.4c.  A 4-
year profile is considered reasonable for the reductions envisaged.  
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Table 5.4c Assumed staffing profile – Option 4(d): Establish 
Education Authority 
 
32.These profiles reflect the assumed staffing profile made for the 
purposes of preparing the costs presented in this FBC. The actual 
movement of staff in/out will depend on a range of factors and may 
differ from the above profiles. 
33.Option 4(d): redundancy costs: there remains, under Option 4(d), 
scope for further redundancies. For the purposes of quantifying the 
costs associated with redundancy for Option 4(d) we have reviewed the 
actual costs incurred as part of the redundancies already delivered 
(2008-2014). Actual costs incurred suggest redundancy costs can be 
determined by a multiplier of 1.8 applied to the relevant salary position. 
Table 5.5 provides a breakdown of the redundancy costs included 
within this FBC under Option 4(d).  
Grades  
1 Apr 
2015 - 
31 Aug 
2015 
1 Sept 
2015 - 
31 Mar 
2016 
1 Apr 
2016 -  
31 Aug 
2016 
1 Sept 
2016 - 
31 Mar 
2017 
1 Apr 
2017 - 
31 Mar 
2018 
1 Apr 
2018 - 
31 Mar 
2019 
1 Apr 
2019 - 
31 Mar 
2020 
1 Apr 
2020- 
31 Mar 
2021 
1 Apr 
2021 - 
31 Mar 
2022 
  
Posts 
 
Senior 
Management  
 
 
52 
 
47 
 
42 
 
37 
 
30 
 
22 
 
22 
 
22 
 
22 
Middle 
Management
/ Professions  
 
553 
 
553 
 
551 
 
551 
 
551 
 
551 
 
551 
 
551 
 
551 
Supervisory 
Management  
1289 1284 1279 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 
Clerical and 
Support  
537 545 555 565 575 582  582 582 582 
Total  
 
2431 
 
2429 
 
2427 
 
2424 
 
2427 
 
2426 
 
2426 
 
2426 
 
2426 
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Table 5.5: Option 4(d) – Establish the Education Authority: redundancy 
cost breakdown 
Grades  
Average 
Salary 
(£) 
Redundancy 
No.  
Redundancy 
Cost (£'000) 
Senior 
Management  
70,753 30 3,821 
Middle 
Management/ 
Professions  
45,083 2 163 
Supervisory 
Management  
25,296 (18) - 
Clerical and 
Support  
14,079 (+45) - 
Total    32 3,984 
 
34.It is assumed that redundancy payments will only be awarded to senior 
management and middle management grades with supervisory 
management and clerical and support grades managed downwards 
through natural wastage. These costs will be incurred in accordance 
with the staff movements as outlined in Table 5.4c above. Redundancy 
costs reflect a transfer payment and in accordance with the guidance 
therefore will be excluded from the analysis of net present cost (NPC) 
but included in the affordability analysis. 
35.Option 4(d): change management and delivery costs: under the 
ESA programme, considerable work that is relevant for the 
establishment of the Education Authority has already been undertaken. 
There will, however, undoubtedly be ongoing change management 
required, particularly during the early years. 
36. Table 5.6 outlines the change costs assumed for Option 4(d). It 
assumes a central change management office as set out in the ESA 
FBC. The Change Programme is assumed to last for three years – as 
opposed to the four years required for Option 3. This is due to the 
“head-start” that the work for ESA (costing £18.145m) provides for the 
work of the Education Authority. 
37.Table 5.6 assumes some costs for accommodation to provide for the 
Chair and members of the Education Authority. These have been 
identified with reference to comparable Boards within NI. 
38.Table 5.6 also assumes costs associated with Excess Fares, which 
are assumed to be lower on-year than the same costs as incurred 
under Option 3, and extend to year 7.  Regionalisation of services and 
better use of IT will require changes to location which will require 
excess mileage protection.  Of the c. 2400 staff it is assumed that 60% 
will not be directly impacted as those services are locally delivered and 
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will remain so. Of the remaining staff it is assumed that 70% will opt to 
stay at their current location and choose a role change.  The remaining 
c. 288 may relocate and avail of excess fares for the initial 3 years.  
With an average return difference of 60 miles between the main 
regional offices, using the civil service travel rate 0.45 p per mile for 
190 days per annum the cost of excess fares would amount to c. £4.5m 
for the programme. These costs are profiled over the programme with a 
peak after the introduction of single ICT systems.  
Table 5.6: Option 4(d) – Change management and delivery costs 
 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Total  
 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22 2022/23 £'000 
Change Director 
Management 
Office & 
Recruitment 
office 
           
1,000 
            
1,000 
               
750   
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
             
2,750 
Accommodation 
(Chair, Board 
and Directors) 
           
180  
            
120 
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
             
300  
Excess Fares 
           
100 
           
350  
           
550 
           
950  
           
850 
           
750  
           
550 
           
400  
         
4,500  
Total 
        
1,280  
         
1,470 1,300 
           
950 
            
850 
           
750  
           
550  
           
400  
         
7,550  
 
34.   IT Systems Upgrades: to-date, considerable work has been 
progressed to understand the ICT implications of moving to a 
regional organisation. DE has advanced a Corporate Services 
Project which includes provision for new consolidated ICT contracts 
to replace existing contracts. This separate project will make 
provision for all necessary IT development work to allow the effective 
implementation of a single Education Authority model. No additional 
costs are therefore included within this business case.   
35.   Re-branding: it has been agreed that no additional monies will be    
made available for rebranding. Instead the Authority brand will be 
introduced to buildings, vehicles and literature over time in line with 
normal refresh and replenish arrangements.  Any branding critical to 
the ‘Day 1’ establishment of the Education Authority will be provided 
for through the change management and delivery budget referenced 
above.  
36.   Estate rationalisation costs: it is anticipated that the establishment 
of the Education Authority will allow for rationalisation across the 
education estate. The potential scope for rationalisation and any 
associated cost have not yet been defined. For the purposes of this 
FBC no costs or benefits from this have been included. 
37.   Total costs: the costs and assumptions outlined in the sections 
above have been brought together within a cost model (see Annex 
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II) to determine the total cost profile for each shortlisted option. The 
total costs over the ten year appraisal period are summarised in 
Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7: total cost summary 
  
Current 
Baseline 
Option 3 - 
(Rebooted
) 
Option 
4(d) –  
CAPITAL COSTS: £'000 £'000 £'000 
  - - - 
Total Capital Costs - - - 
REVENUE COSTS: 
 
  
Staff Salaries 874,110 1,093,299 862,161 
Non Staff Costs 87,411    109,330 86,216 
Redundancy 
Payments 
- - 3,984 
Change Director 
 & Programme 
Management Office 
- 7,800 2,750 
Recruitment Unit - 600 - 
Accommodation 
(Chair, Board and 
Directors) 
- - 300 
Excess Fares - 5,100 4,500 
Total Revenue 
Costs 
961,521 1,216,129 959,911 
 
38. In total (undiscounted cost) terms the option to implement the 
Education Authority reflects a cost saving against the alternative 
position of £256m over a ten year period. If the cost of redundancy is 
removed (as it will be in the NPC analysis given it is a transfer 
payment) the cost saving for the Education Authority increases to 
£260m.  
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Net Present Costs (NPCs) 
39. The basis for the monetary appraisal of shortlisted options is the 
NPCs. The NPC represents the cumulative discounted sum of all 
costs and benefits taken together over the life of the project but 
reflected in today’s terms. 
40. The NPCs presented in this chapter reflect costs and benefits over a 
10 year period from 2015/16 to 2025/26. A discount factor of 3.5 per 
cent has been applied in accordance with NIGEAE guidance.  
41. Table 5.8. provides a summary of the options in monetary terms, 
outlining net undiscounted cost, NPC and ranking.  
Table 5.8 NPCs – options summary 
  
  
Total 
Undiscounted 
Cost 
NPC  NPC 
Ranking 
£'000 
Current baseline 961,521 827,647 2 
Option 3 (Status 
Quo 
(Reconfigured 
and Rebooted)) 
1,216,129 1,043,193 3 
Option 4(d) 
(Establish the 
Education 
Authority) 
955,927 823,873 1 
 
42. Option 4(d) has the lower NPC when assessed against Option 3. The 
status quo (rebooted) option is comparatively very expensive given 
the need to deliver education from a fragmented and inefficient 
platform.  
43. The differential in NPC terms of £219m (over ten years) between 
Option 4(d) and Option 3 demonstrates the monetary case for 
establishing the Education Authority.  
Sensitivity Analysis  
44. The NPC analysis undertaken and the results presented above are 
based upon a number of important assumptions.  It is important that 
the robustness of the NPC analysis is examined through changes to 
these assumptions. Sensitivity analysis has been undertaken to 
determine if and how variations in key assumptions affect the ranking 
of options in NPC terms. 
45. The key assumptions made for the purposes of determining the NPC 
for each shortlisted option include: 
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 The number of staff recruited under the rebooted option; 
 Staffing configurations (increases under Option 3 and efficiencies 
under Option 4 (d));  
 Redundancy payments; 
 Change management and delivery costs; and 
 Recruitment and selection costs. 
46. The scale of staff costs means that they outweigh all other costs. In 
terms of undertaking meaningful sensitivity analysis we will therefore 
consider changes to the staffing profile. 
Sensitivity One – Number of Staff Recruited under Rebooted Option 
47. It is recognised that there is a risk that it may not be possible to recruit 
the number of staff required to reboot fully to the extent set out under 
option 3. While it is acknowledged that the Boards as currently staffed 
are unable to operate effectively, it is considered nonetheless useful 
to introduce a sensitivity that shows what the saving might be if less 
staff were re-employed under the re-booted option. 
48. A sensitivity has therefore been applied which looks at what the 
impact would be of recruiting a reduced number of staff. These are 
applied to option 3 only, as this is the option to which the risk applies, 
although this then allows a comparison to be made with option 4. The 
sensitivity envisages that staff numbers would be rebooted back up to 
the level they were at in April 2012. This was the date chosen as the 
baseline for the ESA FBC, reflecting staff efficiencies achieved 
through vacancy management and voluntary redundancy over the 
period since 2008. The total number of staff under the rebooted option 
would therefore be 2824.  The impact of this sensitivity is summarised 
in Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9. Sensitivity 1 summary  
  Option 3 – Status Quo (Reconfigured and 
Rebooted) 
Option 4(d) – 
Establish the 
Education 
Authority 
Pre Sensitivity Post Sensitivity 
£'000 
Total Costs 1,216,129 1,110,570 955,927 
NPC 1,043,193 953,991 823,873 
NPC Ranking 
 
2 1 
 
49.  As Table 5.9 shows, the saving compared to option 4 under this 
scenario is reduced to £154.6m or £130.1m in NPC terms, which is 
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still a highly significant saving as a result of moving to the single 
Education Authority. 
 
Sensitivity Two – Process Staff efficiencies under the Education 
Authority are reduced  
50. This sensitivity considers that rather than realise a 13% reduction 
across all staff grades from middle management to clerical staff, only 
a 10% reduction is achieved. The impact of this sensitivity is 
summarised in Table 5.10.  
Table 5.10 Sensitivity 2 summary  
  
Option 3 – Status 
quo (reconfigured 
and rebooted) 
Option 4(d) – Establish the Education 
Authority 
Pre Sensitivity Post Sensitivity 
£'000 
Total Costs 1,216,129 955,927 970,709 
NPC 1,043,193 823,873 836,351 
NPC Ranking 2 
 
1 
51. Reducing the staff efficiencies under Option 2 from 13 per cent to ten 
per cent does not change the ranking of options in NPC terms. 
Conclusion to Monetary Assessment 
52.  This analysis has demonstrated that the option of moving to a single 
education authority generates considerable monetary savings when 
compared against the alternative option, which would involve 
rebooting the Boards back up to a sustainable operational level. This 
cost saving is valued in the business case at around £256m over 10 
years or around £219m in NPC terms.  
53.  A sensitivity analysis has been carried out. The first sensitivity looks at 
what the impact would be of lowering the number of staff that would 
be employed under the rebooted option. While it is clear that such a 
scenario is unlikely to be sufficient to enable the rebooted Boards to 
operate in a sustainable manner, the sensitivity still shows the single 
Education Authority making a substantial saving compared to the 
rebooted model. The second senstivity varies assumptions around 
staff efficiencies but again does not change the ranking of options.  
54. The monetary analysis therefore clearly shows option 4(d), the 
establishment of a single Education Authority, to be the preferred 
option in monetary terms.   
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CHAPTER 6: NON MONETARY ASSESSMENT  
Introduction 
1. This chapter of the appraisal provides an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of the shortlisted options that cannot be valued in monetary 
terms. This chapter has been developed taking account of the 
objectives outlined in Chapter 3. 
2. A weighting and scoring approach has been taken to assess the 
shortlisted options in non-monetary terms. Non-monetary criteria 
carrying relative weightings have been developed for the purposes of 
scoring. These were discussed, updated, agreed and then used to 
score the relative non-monetary assessment of Option 3 (Status Quo 
(Reconfigured and Rebooted)) and Option 4(d) (Establish the 
Education Authority) through a desk exercise involving senior members 
of the Department and the ELBs.  
Non-monetary criteria 
3. Table 6.1 outlines the non-monetary criteria, their relative importance 
(weighting) and justification. The criteria draw directly on the objectives 
for the establishment of the Education Authority that were set out in 
Chapter 3. To act as the criteria for the non-monetary assessment, the 
“monetary content” of these objectives has been removed to prevent a 
“double-count” across monetary and non-monetary assessment. 
Otherwise the criteria are identical to the objectives. 
Table 6.1 Non-monetary criteria   
 
Criteria Weighting Explanation 
1 
To provide an 
administrative structure 
that is compatible with 
the new 11 council 
model of local 
government. 
50 
Equal weighting of 50 each is given to 
each objective as both are fundamental to 
the performance of administrative 
structures. Structures that are not 
compatible with the new 11 council model 
of local government have a weakened 
legal basis. No matter how well staffed 
such structures are, they are not 
sustainable on such a basis. Likewise 
structures that are compatible with local 
government, but are not staffed 
accordingly operate through risk and are 
not sustainable.  
2 
To maintain the delivery 
of services currently 
provided by the 
Education and Library 
Boards and maintain 
also the drive always to 
improve the 
effectiveness of those 
services. 
50 
 Total 100  
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Non-monetary scoring 
4. Table 6.2 outlines the scores (0-10) attributed to the criteria for each 
option.  It also applies the weightings identified in Table 6.1 to arrive at 
a total weighted score for each option.  
 
Table 6.2: Non-monetary scoring 
 
Criteria 
Weighting/ 
Max 
Weighted 
Score 
Current Baseline Option 3 (Status 
Quo 
(Reconfigured and 
Rebooted)) 
Option 4(d)  
(Establish the 
Education 
Authority) 
Score 
Weighted 
Score 
Score 
Weighted 
Score 
Score 
Weighted 
Score 
1. To provide an 
administrative structure that 
is compatible with the new 11 
council model of local 
government. 
 
50/500 0 0 10 500 10 500 
2. To maintain the delivery of 
services currently provided 
by the Education and Library 
Boards and maintain also the 
drive always to improve the 
effectiveness of those 
services. 
50/500 1 50 4 200 6 300 
Total 100/1000  50  700  800 
Commentary on Non-monetary scoring 
5. As noted earlier, the scores awarded to each shortlisted option have 
been determined via a desk exercise with ELB and Departmental staff. 
This exercise generated significant debate on the relative potential for 
each option to deliver against the stated objectives and specifically the 
non-monetary criteria. A summary commentary on the scores awarded 
is provided below. It is of course the relationship between the scores of 
Options 3 and 4(d) that is important for this FBC. 
 
6. Criterion 1: to provide an administrative structure that is 
compatible with the new 11 council model of local government. 
Options 3 and 4(d) have here both been awarded maximum marks to 
reflect the practical reality. Compatibility with the new 11 council model 
of local government will be a factual matter, in the first instance, of 
legislation that secures that compatibility in law. It will then be a matter 
of administrative arrangements that deliver that compatibility in 
practice. The current baseline has been awarded a score of zero as the 
structure would be unable to accommodate the new local government 
arrangements. 
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7. Option 3 and 4(d) will differ in the detail with which they secure both 
kinds of compatibility. Option 3 will achieve legal compatibility with the 
11 councils by defining 5 ELBs’ territory and membership by reference 
to them – in the same way that the ELBs territory and membership are 
currently defined by reference to the 26 councils. Option 4(d) will 
achieve legal compatibility with the 11 councils by transcending them at 
the level of legally defined territorial responsibilities (which shall be 
regional) and in the manner of democratic links between education 
administration and politics (which shall be between regional 
administration and the Assembly rather than between sub-regional 
administration and local government). Supporting this, however, would 
be unlimited scope for flexible administrative, sub-regional 
arrangements that should secure as effective working with local 
councils as may be secured by sub-regional organisations.  
 
8. Hence, both options deliver legal compatibility – a matter of fact. Both 
options also provide the same opportunity then for effective 
administrative compatibility. Hence they should both achieve the same, 
maximum score. 
 
9. Criterion 2: to maintain the delivery of services currently provided 
by the Education and Library Boards and maintain also the drive 
always to improve the effectiveness of those services: Option 3: 
Status Quo (Reconfigured and Rebooted) has been awarded a score of 
4/10 whilst Option 4(d): Establish the Education Authority has been 
awarded a score of 6/10. Again, the rationale is that scoring should 
reflect a qualitative difference between the way existing structures and 
a single structure are able to deliver on this criterion. Existing structures 
involve 6 different administrative bodies, 6 different sets of governance 
arrangements, and the management by DE of 6 different sponsorship 
relationships in the provision of services. 
 
10. By contrast, the Education Authority shall simplify this. It shall be the 
single employer of the teaching workforce of Controlled Schools and 
the non-teaching workforce of maintained schools - permitting a 
strategic level of workforce planning that is not currently possible. 
Indeed, the Authority’s employer role shall be flexible and may 
potentially allow for all or some Controlled Schools Boards of 
Governors to appoint school leaders rather than the ELB. The 
Education Authority shall be the single planning authority for Controlled 
Schools, making coherent area-planning simpler.  
 
11. The current structure of 5 ELBs designs-in inconsistency and inequity 
across the provision of services (PEDU reports on catering and 
transport services have demonstrated this very clearly – but provision 
for children with Special Educational Needs, and the issues involved in 
launching regional governor support and school improvement services  
will be other examples). If a single authority is responsible for these 
services it must, over time, regionalise and standardise their delivery. It 
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must bring greater consistency and equity to the implementation of 
Departmental policy and the levels of support provided to educational 
providers, families, children and young people.  
 
12. When fully constituted, the 5 ELBs have involved approximately 130 
board members in the oversight of their delivery of education services. 
Each elects their own Chair in accordance with the Education and 
Libraries (NI) Order 1986. In their stead, overseeing all of the same 
responsibilities and services, and accountable for them to DE, would be 
the 20 members of the Education Authority: 
 
 8 political representatives appointed under the d’Hondt 
mechanism; 
 4 members representative of the interests of the Transferors; 
 4 members representative of the interests of Trustees; and 
 1 member each representative of the interests of integrated, 
voluntary grammar, controlled grammar and Irish medium 
schools.  
13. In addition, the Chair would be appointed by the DE Minister in 
accordance with the more modern and best-practice governance 
provisions of the new Education Bill. These shall be supported by one 
Chief Executive Officer / Accounting Officer who shall provide 
leadership to an organisation relating to all Controlled schools, 
maintained schools, contractors and providers in one consistent way in 
terms of funding, employment, planning and the provision of services. 
This shall enable a direct line of support, challenge and accountability. 
 
14. These are the reasons why Option 4(d) (Establish the Education 
Authority) outscores Option 3 (Status Quo (Reconfigured and 
Rebooted)) against Objective 2. At the same time, Option 4(d) does not 
achieve the maximum score against Objective 2. This is because it is 
not primarily a services - and standards-related reform. It does not, like 
ESA for instance, change the functions and duties of education 
administration to charge it with raising standards and delivering area-
planning. Amongst the structural reforms that achieve compatibility with 
local government, establishing the Education Authority most promises 
to maintain and improve the service-delivery of the ELBs. That is what 
the non-monetary scoring reflects.    
 
15. Clearly, the current baseline option is operationally unsustainable, as is 
reflected in the low score awarded against this criterion for this option.    
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Summary  
 
16. Each of the shortlisted options has been assessed against a range of 
non-monetary criteria to determine a ranking in non monetary terms. A 
summary of the results are presented in Table 6.3: 
 
 
Table 6.3: summary of non-monetary analysis 
 
Option Non Monetary Score 
Ranking in Non 
Monetary Terms 
Current baseline  
 
50 3 
Option 3 (Status 
Quo 
(Reconfigured 
and Rebooted)) 
 
700 2 
Option 4(d)  
(Establish the 
Education 
Authority) 
 
800 1 
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CHAPTER 7: ASSESSMENT OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
Introduction 
1. It is important that the risk implications of both shortlisted options are 
considered and assessed in determining the preferred way forward and 
that appropriate mitigating strategies are identified. Potential ongoing 
risk impacting upon the monetary costs identified in Chapter 5 is also 
addressed through potential optimism bias (OB).   
Option 4(d) (Establish EA): risk management  
2. The process for managing the risks involved is ready as part of the 
Programme to establish the Education Authority. The Education 
Authority Project Management Board (PMB) will regularly review the 
identified risks, their impact, likelihood and importantly the approach 
being taken to mitigate and manage them through a formal risk 
register. This register shall be maintained by the Directorate within DE 
that shall be dedicated to the programme’s implementation. The PMB 
Risk Register will be supported by separate risk registers associated 
with the various projects that comprise the change programme. The EA 
PMB risk register will also feed into the Department’s Corporate Risk 
Register, with escalation arrangements in place to allow the 
Departmental Board to review risks when appropriate in line with the 
Department’s Risk Management Framework. 
3. In accordance with NIGEAE, the PMB Risk Register and its supporting 
registers will identify each relevant risk and consider (with 
quantification) how it impacts upon the programme’s/project’s 
objective(s). Risks will be individually enumerated, and each 
assessment/revision will be dated. Each risk will have a textual 
description, and an assessment of likelihood and impact both before 
and after the action plan to manage and improve the risk 
(countermeasures) will be considered. Officers responsible for actions 
that manage and improve the risk will be clearly identified as are 
timescales. Risk status is clearly identified through a numerical and 
traffic-light rating.    
4. Against each identified risk will be detailed mitigating actions aligned to 
a Responsible Officer with target dates agreed.  DE and its 
implementation Programme structure, more particularly, will be charged 
with these roles and will work across the Department, other 
Departments and ALBs jointly to ensure all risks are mitigated so as not 
to undermine the effective establishment of the Education Authority or 
the realisation of objectives as outlined in Chapter 3. 
5. A copy of the PMB risk register is included at Annex I.   
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Risk of Option 3 (Status Quo (Reconfigured and Rebooted)) 
6. The risks identified in the PMB Risk Register and the processes 
outlined refer specifically to Option 4(d) (Establish the Education 
Authority). It is important for the purposes of this FBC that the risks of 
adopting Option 3 (Status Quo (Reconfigured and Rebooted)) are also 
outlined. 
7. Option 3 will require just as large a change programme as Option 4(d) 
– but also one that is potentially more complex, more granular and 
more contentious. Reconfiguration to the minimum extent required will 
create 5 new sets of ELB boundaries. Approximately 15% of the 
Schools Estate and schools-based workforce will change ELB in terms 
of ownership and employer as a result of these new boundaries. The 
change programme then will comprise 5 different inter-ELB exchanges 
of responsibilities (staff, assets, responsibilities, liabilities) to a scale 
that may reasonably be assumed to represent 15% of each 
organisation’s responsibilities – both in and out.  
8. Option 3’s change programme will also be just as subject to the 
passage of legislation as Option 4(d).  While the legislation for Option 3 
is subordinate, it will still require a political agreement to a new balance 
of political representation in education administration – insofar as it will 
realign ELBs to a new set of councils.  
9. Given this, Option 3 has its own versions of the risks of Option 4(d). 
Some appear, in fact, to be more complex and serious. The 
reconfiguration and rebooting of the 5 ELBs: 
 (1) may not be ready for 1 April, 2015 and may require existing 
structures to continue while not compatible with the new 11 local 
councils; 
 (2) may find the establishment of new governance structures and 
the establishment of permanent senior management structures 
challenging in a context where, for so long, the ELBs have been 
considered not the future, and very much the past, of education 
administration; 
 (3) may find the division of functions, staff, assets etc into those that 
are to transfer and those that are to be retained very challenging 
irrespective of the pressured timeframe;  
 (4) may find that this granular exchange of functions, staff, assets 
etc across 5 organisations threatens business continuity in the 
services they provide. 
10. In addition to these, Option 3 then has some of its own particular risks. 
These include very obviously the budgetary and affordability risks 
(given the additional funding required to reconfigure and reboot) and 
the risks, relatively speaking, of failing to improve the effective delivery 
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of education services. Both have been illustrated through the monetary 
assessment (Chapter 5) and the non-monetary assessment (Chapter 
6). Furthermore, by re-committing to the 5 ELBs, Option 3 would write-
off any positive return on the investment made to-date on the 
establishment of ESA – approximately £18m since 2006.  
Optimism Bias  
11. Optimism bias can be defined as the tendency for appraisers to be 
overly-optimistic about key project parameters, including capital costs, 
works duration, operating costs and expected benefits.  The Green 
Book (and NIGEAE) requires appraisers to make explicit, empirically-
based adjustments to take account of optimism bias. The expectation is 
that monetary costs and benefits should be clearly defined at FBC 
stage and any OB adjustment reduced accordingly or indeed removed.  
12. The potential for bias/risk in relation to all cost categories has been 
assessed. The costs presented in Chapter 5 reflect accumulated 
knowledge since the ESA OBC position (2008) and are not deemed to 
include bias. There is recognition of uncertainty in relation to several of 
the key assumptions.  
Summary 
13. DE, working with other partners, has established a robust process for 
the identification, management and reduction of risks associated with 
the implementation of the Education Authority. This process will 
manage several important risks and actions and accountabilities are in 
place to ensure that these risks do not undermine the success of 
implementation.  The process flows from and reflects the Department’s 
corporate arrangements for risk management, including as 
documented in its Risk Management Framework. 
14. The option to reconfigure and reboot the ELBs within the education 
sector (Option 3) would bring with it a serious risk in terms of 
affordability and pressure on the education budget, and a margin of risk 
in terms of the effectiveness of service delivery. It will also sink the 
value of all £18.145m to-date invested in restructuring education 
through the ESA Programme. This exacerbates the affordability and 
budgetary risks when compared with Option 4(d), and risks reputational 
damage and public confidence.  
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CHAPTER 8: SELECTION OF PREFERRED OPTION 
Identification of Preferred Option  
1. The purpose of this chapter is to combine the NPC results with the 
results from the assessment of non-monetary factors and risk in order 
to identify an economically preferred option. 
2. Table 8.1 provides a summary of the key findings from the economic 
appraisal carried out within the business case. 
Table 8.1 Identification of preferred option 
Attribute 
Current 
Baseline 
Option 3 (Status 
Quo (Reconfigured 
and rebooted)) 
Option 4(d) 
Establish the 
Education 
Authority 
Total Costs over the life 
of the project (£’000) 
961,521 1,216,129 955,927 
NPC (£’000) 827,647 1,043,193 823,873 
NPC Ranking 2 3 1 
Non-Monetary Benefits 50 700 800 
Non-Monetary Ranking 3 2 1 
Overall Option Ranking 3 2 1 
3. The assessment of NPC demonstrates that Option 4(d) (Establish the 
Education Authority) offers the potential to realise significant monetary 
savings against the alternative status quo position. Over a 10 year 
investment appraisal period a differential of £219m in NPC has been 
determined between the two options. The differential is primarily due to 
staff savings assumed under the Education Authority model and the 
vacancy control placed on ELBs from 2008.  
4. The establishment of the Education Authority also demonstrates a 
greater ability to achieve identified non monetary outcomes than does 
the alternative position. Furthermore, the risks evident under Option 
4(d) can be managed through successful management and mitigation, 
whereas those under Option 3 would present more serious challenges 
and be difficult to mitigate. 
5.  Option 4(d) (Establish the Education Authority) is recommended as the 
preferred option. The establishment of the Education Authority is 
deemed to demonstrate value for money when assessed against 
alternative options. Annex II provides further detail on the NPC and 
sensitivity analysis.  
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CHAPTER 9: ARRANGEMENTS FOR FINANCING, PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
AND BENEFITS REALISATION 
Introduction 
1. We set out below an assessment of the implementation, governance, 
financing and benefits realisation arrangements associated with the 
establishment of the Education Authority. At the stage of this FBC, 
arrangements for all of the above are at the design-stage. 
Implementation Plans 
2. The establishment and successful operation of the Education Authority 
represents a significant programme not only for DE but for the 
Executive. Accordingly considerable investment will be made in 
developing, reviewing and delivering against key milestones as set out 
within an overarching Programme Implementation Plan.  
3. Within the programme as designed a number of projects and project 
teams have been identified.  A summary of the overarching programme 
with details of individual projects is provided at Annex III.  
Affordability Analysis  
4. It is important, particularly in the current public funding climate, that the 
financial affordability of taking forward the preferred option – Option 
4(d) - is assessed. In accordance with the NIGEAE guidance, the 
annual costs have been adjusted to include inflation and remove 
discounting: 
 Given the absence of any capital spend, depreciation charges 
have been avoided;  
 Inflation has been applied to all revenue costs in accordance with 
HMT’s GDP Deflator (March 2014); and  
 Transfer payments excluded from the NPC analysis have been 
included. This includes the cost of redundancy.  
5. Table 9.1 summarises the resource DEL requirements for the 
implementation of the Education Authority.
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Table 9.1:  Education Authority Affordability Profile 
         
            Year  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TOTAL 
FY 15/16 16/17 17/18 18/19 19/20 20/21 21/22 22/23 23/24 24/25   
                        
EA Revenue Costs (£000s):                       
Staff Salaries 88,483 88,576 89,951 90,786 92,586 94,472 96,358 98,244 100,216 102,274 941,946 
Non Staff Costs 8,848 8,858 8,995 9,079 9,259 9,447 9,636 9,824 10,022 10,227 94,195 
Redundancy Costs 638 1,600 891 855             3,984 
Programme Mgt Office & 
Recruitment 1,000 1,019 779               2,798 
Accommodation (Chair, Board, 
Directors) 180 122                 302 
Excess Fares 100 357 571 1,006 918 827 618 458     4,855 
TOTAL EA REVENUE COSTS 
(£000s) 99,249 100,531 101,187 101,726 102,763 104,746 106,612 108,527 110,238 112,501 1,048,079 
                        
Baseline Costs (£000s):                       
Staff Salaries (based on Sept 14 
posts) 87,411 89,072 90,733 92,568 94,404 96,327 98,250 100,173 102,183 104,281 955,402 
Non Staff Costs (based on Sept 
14 posts) 8,741 8,907 9,073 9,257 9,440 9,633 9,825 10,017 10,218 10,428 95,540 
TOTAL BASELINE COSTS 
(£000s) 96,152 97,979 99,806 101,825 103,844 105,960 108,075 110,190 112,402 114,709 1,050,942 
                        
EA AFFORDABILITY GAP 
(£000s) 3,097 2,552 1,381 -99 -1,081 -1,214 -1,463 -1,663 -2,164 -2,209 -2,863 
Inflation (HMT GDP Deflator 
estimates) 1 1.019 1.038 1.059 1.08 1.102 1.124 1.146 1.169 1.193   
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6. Whilst there is a requirement for additional funding of c. £12m during the initial 
term to successfully implement the EA and cover redundancy payments, 
these costs are offset by the overall savings in staff costs through the 
implementation of the EA.  This amounts to a net saving of c. £2.9m over a 
ten year period when compared against the September 2014 baseline. 
Management and Governance Arrangements  
7. Work towards the implementation of the Education Authority will build on 
structures established to implement ESA. These have been ongoing for a 
number of years now and their management and governance arrangements 
are well established. Accountabilities are defined at Ministerial level with a 
Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) from within DE.  
8. A delivery programme is currently defined which essentially ascribes to the 
ESA Implementation Team and the ESA Delivery Directorate projects in 
keeping with their specialised role and experience developed under the ESA 
Programme – with appropriate changes in nomenclature (“EA Implementation 
Team” and “EA Delivery Directorate” respectively).  Accordingly, there shall 
remain two halves of the programme: 
 The DE Delivery Strand – comprising projects on legislation, 
governance and accountability framework for the Education Authority, 
the establishment of the new sectoral body and secretarial support for 
the whole programme; and  
 The operational strand – covering transition to the new organisation, 
HR and operational continuity and involving expertise from the dissolving 
organisations themselves. 
9. The main activities of the programme as set out in Annex III are summarised 
by its seven projects: 
 Legislation, Equality and Communication:  
 Governance 
 Controlled Schools Support Council 
 Finance and Dissolution 
 Operations and Services 
 HR 
 Review of ALBs 
 
10. The overarching programme structure is set at Annex IV. 
11. As a programme with whole life total central government costs of over £20 
million, the EA Implementation Programme will be subject to a Gateway 
Review in accordance with Procurement Guidance Notes 01/09 (Best Practice 
in Programme/Project Management) and 03/09 (Threshold Limits to Be 
Applied as Part of the Gateway Review Process) issued by DFP’s Central 
Procurement Directorate. 
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12. The Programme will undergo a Gateway 0 Review to investigate its direction 
and planned outcomes, together with the progress of its constituent projects.  
This will provide important assurance to the SRO and the Departmental 
Accounting Officer that rigorous independent assessment of the Programme 
and the resources invested in it is taking place.  It will allow the Programme to 
change course or address issues that have the potential to undermine the 
objectives or affect the projected benefits. 
13. A minimum of three Gate 0 reviews will be undertaken: an early review, one 
or more reviews at key decision points during the course of the Programme 
and a final review at the conclusion of the Programme.  The number of Gate 0 
reviews, each of which will incur a fixed cost of £12,000, will be kept to the 
minimum required consistent with the progress of the Programme. 
Benefits Management 
14. The Department recognises the importance of effective benefits management 
and the realisation of benefits through active management. Therefore in the 
development of this FBC and in taking forward the programme of work to 
establish the Education Authority, the Department and in particular the key 
parties to its programme structure have worked to identify and profile benefits.  
15. Aligning with the objectives (Chapter 3), a comprehensive benefit framework 
has been developed which supports the articulation of measurable benefits. 
This framework identified for both of the programme objectives: 
 Outcomes – eventual end benefits;  
 Enablers – capabilities/activities to be delivered by the Education 
Authority;  
 Outputs – measurable benefits; and  
 Targets – metrics against which the realisation of benefits can be 
tracked and recorded.  
16. This Benefit Framework is attached at Annex V. In accordance with the NICS 
approach to Benefits Management the Benefit Framework has been 
developed into a Benefits Dependency Network (BDN), aligning the new 
tangible capabilities that will be delivered by the Education Authority to the 
strategic objectives for the programme through a series of intermediate and 
measurable benefits. A copy of the BDN is provided at Annex VI.  
17. For each intermediate benefit the Education Authority shall be committed to a 
programme of management and monitoring towards ultimate realisation. To 
support this, individual benefit profiles have been developed which identify 
key features for each measurable benefit including detail on:  
 Accountability for realisation;  
 Ownership for management and measurement;  
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 Measurements assigned, baseline and target values and 
corresponding dates;  
 Priority and likelihood of failure;  
 Key actions for management of benefit; and  
 Risks impacting upon the benefit.  
18. Benefit profiles are contained at Annex VII.  
Monitoring and Evaluation 
19. Following the establishment of the Education Authority, it will be essential to 
assess the effectiveness of the project by carrying out a Post Project 
Evaluation (PPE).  The main objective of this evaluation will be to assess and 
report on the benefits have been derived from EA, against those that were 
envisaged (Annexes V-VII). The PPE will: 
 assess whether the objectives outlined in the business case have been 
achieved; 
 assess whether the project was delivered on time; 
 compare the actual costs of the project with those estimated within the 
business case (with any variances explained); 
 compare the potential savings delivered by the project with those 
estimated within the business case (with any variances explained); 
 Compare the actual staff profile against the expected profile outlined in the 
business case; 
 Assess the realisation of benefits outlined in the BRP; 
 Highlight any lessons learned/recommendations for future projects. 
 
20. In line with the timescale of many of these key benefits, the PPE will be 
conducted by DE three full years after the formal establishment of the 
Education Authority with arrangements made to ensure objectivity. 
Summary and Conclusion 
21. This FBC has sought to determine whether the establishment and 
implementation of the Education Authority remains the best value for money, 
and is affordable and achievable in 2015. The analysis of costs, risks and 
non-monetary factors has demonstrated this. The creation of the Education 
Authority will meet the challenge to education administration that is posed by 
local government reform. It shall also do so in the most efficient manner and 
in the way that is most likely to improve the delivery of educational services. 
Re-structuring multiple and sub-regional organisations into one regional 
authority should improve the delivery of education services to children and 
young people generally and improve the capacity to deliver upon the priorities 
and strategic leadership of the Minister and the Executive. More specifically, 
whilst maintaining the valuable diversity and autonomy that exists within our 
education system, the Education Authority: 
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 shall bring much greater coherence to meeting key challenges such as the 
ongoing drive to raise standards, foster school improvement and plan 
strategically and sustainably the education provision of every area; 
 shall greatly simplify governance in education administration; 
 shall regionalise and bring equality to the provision of support services; 
 shall make education administration sustainable without the costs of 
“rebooting”. 
Intrinsically, our existing structures cannot compare well against all aspects of 
this model.  
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ANNEX I:  HIGH LEVEL RISK REGISTER – AMENDED AS AT 2/2/2015 
Risk 1- COMPLETED 
Objective 
To pass the necessary legislation to enable the establishment of a single Education Authority to 
replace the 5 ELBs &the Staff Commission by April 15. 
Risk Description Consequences 
Failure to secure necessary legislative underpinning 
for Education Authority. 
 
 Delay in implementation of EA. 
 
 Adverse impact on delivery of education 
services. 
 
 Loss of organisational credibility and 
adverse publicity. 
 
 Potential for legal challenge - ELB 
boundaries incompatible with new local 
government boundaries.  
Lead Risk Owner Risk Dashboard (complete this section last: 
A= Appetite, I = Inherent R=Residual status) 
Fiona Hepper R A,I   
Inherent Risk Rating (before any action taken) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 2 10 
Primary Root Causes Current Actions to Manage Risk 
(Include Corresponding Business Plan 
Ref., where appropriate) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Failure to secure political consensus 
to progress legislation.  
Lack of time to ensure passage of 
Bill 
Minimal Bill to secure consensus 
 
Accelerated passage used to expedite 
legislation. 
Beverley Wall 
Residual Risk Rating* (in light of current actions) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 1 5 
Action Plan for Improvement 
 (Residual Risk to be reviewed once additional actions completed) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Target Date 
   
Contingency  (to be developed for risks assessed as having a potentially high impact, irrespective of 
the potential likelihood, or where risks are external and largely outside of our control) 
 
Review 
Date Outcome Risk Movement:  ▲▼► 
27 January  15 Education Act (2014) received Royal Assent 
on 11/12/14. 
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Risk 2 
Objective 
To ensure the appropriate finance and accountability arrangements are in place to allow the new 
Education Authority to be functional from April 2015 
Risk Description Consequences 
Appropriate financial management and 
accountability arrangements not in place.  
 Delay in establishment of EA. 
 
 The Comptroller and Auditor General 
(C&AG) qualifies his audit opinion on the 
final accounts of the dissolving bodies. 
 
 EA does not adhere to the Government 
Guidelines on ALBs. 
 
 Adverse impact on delivery of education 
services from 1 April 2015 
 
 Not all critical day 1 issues addressed 
 
 Lack of clarity and consistency in the 
decision making and accountability 
processes 
 
 Failure to pay staff and/or contractors results 
in financial penalties on EA  
 
 Difficulty in setting a budget 
 
 Challenges in the provision of timely 
consolidated accounts for EA 
 
 Loss of organisational credibility and adverse 
publicity 
 
 Potential legal challenges  
 
Lead Risk Owner Risk Dashboard (complete this section last: A= 
Appetite, I = Inherent R=Residual status) 
Fiona Hepper  A, R I  
Inherent Risk Rating (before any action taken) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 3 15 
Primary Root Causes Current Actions to Manage Risk 
(Include Corresponding Business 
Plan Ref., where appropriate) 
Responsible Officer 
Programme governance structure 
not agreed and implemented in 
time to deliver on critical Day 1 
tasks 
 
Day 1 critical structures and 
Programme governance structure and 
accountabilities agreed by DE and 
Interim Chief Executive 
 
 
 
Interim CEO to finalise and agree 
structures and responsibilities for Day 1 
Fiona Hepper/Gavin 
Boyd 
 
 
Gavin Boyd 
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responsibilities not agreed  
 
Financial resources not agreed 
 
Insufficient time to consult and 
quality assure key processes with 
stakeholders in advance of Day 1 
Processes not set in place to 
begin transition (such as new 
banking contract not being in 
place, the transfer of assets and 
liabilities not being completed). 
 
 
MSFM fails to provide optimal mix 
of control and delegation of 
authority. 
 
 
Identify and secure essential resource 
requirements  
 
 
 
EADD and EAIT to engage immediately 
with ELBs on the delivery of critical Day 
1 tasks 
 
 
Finance project developed to include: 
 Dissolution Board establishment and 
action plan. Dissolution Steering 
Group has met twice to date to 
identify issues and allocate key 
actions to organisations to take 
forward. Banking contract procured 
 
 MSFM being prepared. Draft FM has 
been circulated internally within DE 
for comment.   
  Corporate Governance relationship 
between DE and EA has been 
agreed by the Minister. 
 
 Audit plan prepared 
 
Gavin Boyd/Pat O’Neill 
 
 
Trevor Connolly/Pat 
O’Neill 
 
T Connolly/P O’Neill 
 
 
 
 
 
G Fair/T Connolly 
 
 
 
G Fair 
Residual Risk Rating* (in light of current actions) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 2 10 
Action Plan for Improvement 
 (Residual Risk to be reviewed once additional actions 
completed) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Target Date 
   
Contingency  (to be developed for risks assessed as having a potentially high impact, irrespective of 
the potential likelihood, or where risks are external and largely outside of our control) 
 
Review 
Date Outcome Risk Movement:  ▲▼► 
2 February  2015   
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Risk 3 
Objective 
To ensure the Education Authority Board is established with effective governance arrangements  in 
place by April 2015 
Risk Description Consequences 
Failure to appoint Board for Education Authority 
and put in place necessary governance 
arrangements for Board. 
 Delay in establishment of EA 
 
 Adverse impact on delivery of education 
services 
 
 Loss of organisational credibility and adverse 
publicity 
 
 Potential legal challenges  
Lead Risk Owner Risk Dashboard (complete this section last: A= 
Appetite, I = Inherent R=Residual status) 
Fiona Hepper  A, R  I 
Inherent Risk Rating (before any action taken) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 4 20 
Primary Root Causes Current Actions to Manage Risk 
(Include Corresponding Business 
Plan Ref., where appropriate) 
Responsible Officer 
Limited time to have revised 
Teaching Appointments 
Committee(TAC) procedures in 
place 
Process commenced to provide policy 
guidance and procedures for TACs 
Laverne 
Montgomery/Robbie 
McGreevy 
Limited time to complete process 
to appoint Board. 
Process has started.  Political parties 
and Sectoral interests groups have been 
asked for Board nominations.  
Recruitment process for post of Chair 
nearing completion. Training 
programme being developed for Board. 
Gary Fair 
EA governance documentation 
and/or processes do not attract 
the level of scrutiny, diligence. 
DE to identify suitable shared resource 
to support development of processes. 
Implement programme of work 
immediately. 
Gary Fair/Pat O’Neill 
Residual Risk Rating* (in light of current actions) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 2 10 
Action Plan for Improvement 
 (Residual Risk to be reviewed once additional actions 
completed) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Target Date 
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Contingency  (to be developed for risks assessed as having a potentially high impact, irrespective of 
the potential likelihood, or where risks are external and largely outside of our control) 
 
Review 
Date Outcome Risk Movement:  ▲▼► 
2 February  2015   
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Risk 4 
Objective 
To ensure the necessary resources are in place to allow the Education Authority to be functional by 
April 2015 
Risk Description Consequences 
Insufficient resources to deliver programme to 
establish Education Authority.  
 
 Delay in implementation 
 
 Day 1 critical tasks not delivered or partially 
delivered 
 
 Loss of organisational credibility and adverse 
publicity 
 
 Potential legal challenges  
 
Lead Risk Owner Risk Dashboard (complete this section last: A= 
Appetite, I = Inherent R=Residual status) 
Fiona Hepper  A, R  I 
Inherent Risk Rating (before any action taken) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 4 20 
Primary Root Causes Current Actions to Manage Risk 
(Include Corresponding Business 
Plan Ref., where appropriate) 
Responsible Officer 
NI economic environment and 
budget allocation 
DE/CEO prioritise available resources 
and align to critical projects  
Fiona Hepper/Gavin 
Boyd 
Delay in identifying staff to 
support the delivery of the 
programme of work to establish 
EA. 
Immediate engagement between EAIT 
with ELBs on the delivery of critical Day 
1 issues. 
Gavin Boyd/Pat 
O’Neill 
ELB staffing structures are 
depleted as a consequence of the 
DE Savings Delivery Plan. This 
limits the availability of resources, 
particularly given the challenging 
timeframe within which the 
Programme is to be delivered. 
EAIT work with ELB CEOs to plan, 
prioritise and implement programme of 
work 
Gavin Boyd/Pat 
O’Neill 
Residual Risk Rating* (in light of current actions) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 2 10 
Action Plan for Improvement 
 (Residual Risk to be reviewed once additional actions 
completed) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Target Date 
   
   
Contingency  (to be developed for risks assessed as having a potentially high impact, irrespective of 
the potential likelihood, or where risks are external and largely outside of our control) 
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Review 
Date Outcome Risk Movement:  ▲▼► 
2 February  2015   
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Risk 5 
Objective 
To ensure the commitment of key stakeholders to the establishment of the Education Authority by April 
2015 
Risk Description Consequences 
The support and buy in of key stakeholders (e.g. 
political representatives, staff and teachers) is not 
achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 Adverse impact on delivery of education 
services.  Inconsistency of messages to 
the public. 
  
 Lack of clarity in relation to accessing 
services from Day 1 
 
 Loss of organisational credibility and 
adverse publicity 
 
Lead Risk Owner Risk Dashboard (complete this section last: 
A= Appetite, I = Inherent R=Residual status) 
Fiona Hepper R A  I 
Inherent Risk Rating (before any action taken) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 4 20 
Primary Root Causes Current Actions to Manage Risk 
(Include Corresponding Business Plan 
Ref., where appropriate) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Failure to prioritise communications 
as a key part of obtaining buy-in 
from stakeholders 
 
 
Communications plan drafted and being 
implemented to pro-actively engage with 
Stakeholders. 
Re-engage Communications Group to plan 
and implement Stakeholder Communication 
Plan e.g. Schools 
Beverley Wall/Pat 
O’Neill 
Pat 
O’Neill/Frances 
Byrne 
Unions fail to engage  to review 
Day 1 critical policies 
Series of meetings planned with TUS.  First 
meeting held on 6th January.  Other 
meetings have been scheduled. 
 
 
La’Verne 
Montgomery 
/Robbie 
McGreevy 
ELBs fail to engage to support 
delivery of critical day 1 tasks 
EAIT has re-engaged with ELB Working 
Group representatives. 
 
Initiate Transition Board. 
P O’Neill 
 
Gavin Boyd 
Residual Risk Rating* (in light of current actions) 
Impact Likelihood Risk Score 
5 3 15 
Action Plan for Improvement 
 (Residual Risk to be reviewed once additional actions 
completed) 
Responsible 
Officer 
Target Date 
Briefing with Education Committee Scheduled for 18
th
 February 
Engagement events scheduled with DE staff in Mid-Feb and mid-
B Wall 
 
11
th
 Feb 
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March B Wall 6th Feb  
   
Contingency  (to be developed for risks assessed as having a potentially high impact, irrespective of 
the potential likelihood, or where risks are external and largely outside of our control) 
 
Review 
Date Outcome Risk Movement:  ▲▼► 
2 February  2015   
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ANNEX II: NET PRESENT COST 
 
NPV @ 3.5% p.a.                       
APPRAISAL DATE: 16/01/2015                     
OPTION NUMBER & TITLE: Option 1 - Current Baseline                 
YEAR : Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 TOTAL 
 
CAPITAL COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
A. Total Capital Costs (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Total Capital Costs (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
 
REVENUE COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
Staff Salaries 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 87,411 874,110 
Non Staff Costs 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 8,741 87,411 
C. Total Revenue Costs (Annual) 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 961,521 
D. Total Revenue Costs (Cumulative) 96,152 192,304 288,456 384,608 480,761 576,913 673,065 769,217 865,369 961,521   
E. Total Costs (Annual)  (=A+C) 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 961,521 
F. Total Costs (Cumulative) (=B+D) 96,152 192,304 288,456 384,608 480,761 576,913 673,065 769,217 865,369 961,521   
 
BENEFITS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
G. Total Benefits (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H. Total Benefits (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
NET UNDISCOUNTED COST*  (=E-G) 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 96,152 961,521 
DISCOUNT FACTOR @ 3.5% p.a. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
NET PRESENT COST* (Annual) 96,152 92,901 89,759 86,724 83,791 80,957 78,220 75,575 73,019 70,550 827,647 
NET PRESENT  COST* (Cumulative) 96,152 189,053 278,812 365,535 449,326 530,284 608,504 684,078 757,097 827,647   
TOTAL NET PRESENT COST* = 827,647 * A minus sign in these rows denotes a Net Present Value rather than a Net Present Cost.   
 
 
  
Add Row
Add Row
Add Row
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NPV @ 3.5% p.a.                       
APPRAISAL DATE: 16/01/2015                     
OPTION NUMBER & TITLE: Option 3: Status Quo (Reconfigured and Rebooted)             
YEAR : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TOTAL 
 
CAPITAL COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
A. Total Capital Costs (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Total Capital Costs (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
 
REVENUE COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
Staff Salaries 89,376 101,235 112,836 112,836 112,836 112,836 112,836 112,836 112,836 112,836 1,093,299 
Non Staff Costs 8,938 10,124 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 109,330 
Change Management Programme 2,600 2,600 2,000 600             7,800 
Recruitment 200 200 200               600 
Excess Fares 850 1,700 1,700 850             5,100 
C. Total Revenue Costs (Annual) 101,964 115,859 128,020 125,570 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 1,216,129 
D. Total Revenue Costs (Cumulative) 101,964 217,822 345,842 471,411 595,531 719,651 843,770 967,890 1,092,009 1,216,129   
E. Total Costs (Annual)  (=A+C) 101,964 115,859 128,020 125,570 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 1,216,129 
F. Total Costs (Cumulative) (=B+D) 101,964 217,822 345,842 471,411 595,531 719,651 843,770 967,890 1,092,009 1,216,129   
 
BENEFITS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
G. Total Benefits (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H. Total Benefits (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
NET UNDISCOUNTED COST*  (=E-G) 101,964 115,859 128,020 125,570 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 124,120 1,216,129 
DISCOUNT FACTOR @ 3.5% p.a. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
NET PRESENT COST* (Annual) 101,964 111,941 119,508 113,257 108,163 104,505 100,971 97,557 94,258 91,070 1,043,193 
NET PRESENT  COST* (Cumulative) 101,964 213,904 333,412 446,668 554,831 659,337 760,308 857,865 952,123 1,043,193   
TOTAL NET PRESENT COST* = 1,043,193 * A minus sign in these rows denotes a Net Present Value rather than a Net Present Cost.   
 
  
Add Row
Add Row
Add Row
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NPV @ 3.5% p.a.                       
APPRAISAL DATE: 16/01/2015                     
OPTION NUMBER & TITLE: Option 4(d): Establish Education Authority               
YEAR : Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 TOTAL 
 
CAPITAL COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
A. Total Capital Costs (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Total Capital Costs (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
 
REVENUE COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
Staff Salaries 88,483 86,924 86,658 85,728 85,728 85,728 85,728 85,728 85,728 85,728 862,161 
Non Staff Costs 8,848 8,692 8,666 8,573 8,573 8,573 8,573 8,573 8,573 8,573 86,216 
Programme Management & Recruitment Costs 1,000 1,000 750               2,750 
Accommodation (Chair, Board and Directors) 180 120                 300 
Excess Fares 100 350 550 950 850 750 550 400     4,500 
C. Total Revenue Costs (Annual) 98,611 97,086 96,624 95,251 95,151 95,051 94,851 94,701 94,301 94,301 955,927 
D. Total Revenue Costs (Cumulative) 98,611 195,698 292,322 387,572 482,723 577,774 672,625 767,326 861,626 955,927   
E. Total Costs (Annual)  (=A+C) 98,611 97,086 96,624 95,251 95,151 95,051 94,851 94,701 94,301 94,301 955,927 
F. Total Costs (Cumulative) (=B+D) 98,611 195,698 292,322 387,572 482,723 577,774 672,625 767,326 861,626 955,927   
 
BENEFITS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
G. Total Benefits (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H. Total Benefits (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
NET UNDISCOUNTED COST*  (=E-G) 98,611 97,086 96,624 95,251 95,151 95,051 94,851 94,701 94,301 94,301 955,927 
DISCOUNT FACTOR @ 3.5% p.a. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
NET PRESENT COST* (Annual) 98,611 93,803 90,199 85,911 82,918 80,030 77,161 74,434 71,613 69,191 823,873 
NET PRESENT  COST* (Cumulative) 98,611 192,415 282,614 368,525 451,443 531,473 608,635 683,069 754,682 823,873   
TOTAL NET PRESENT COST* = 823,873 * A minus sign in these rows denotes a Net Present Value rather than a Net Present Cost. 
 
 
Add Row
Add Row
Add Row
 
 
 
75 
 
NPV @ 3.5% p.a.                       
APPRAISAL DATE: 16/01/0215                     
OPTION NUMBER & TITLE: Sensitivity 1 - Reboot to April 2012               
YEAR : Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 TOTAL 
 
CAPITAL COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
A. Total Capital Costs (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Total Capital Costs (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
 
REVENUE COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
Staff Salaries 89,238 93,648 98,672 102,254 102,254 102,254 102,254 102,254 102,254 102,254 997,336 
Non Staff Costs 8,924 9,365 9,867 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 99,734 
Change Management Programme 2,600 2,600 2,000 600             7,800 
Recruitment 200 200 200               600 
Excess Fares 850 1,700 1,700 850             5,100 
C. Total Revenue Costs (Annual) 101,812 107,513 112,439 113,929 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 1,110,570 
D. Total Revenue Costs (Cumulative) 101,812 209,325 321,764 435,693 548,173 660,652 773,131 885,611 998,090 1,110,570   
E. Total Costs (Annual)  (=A+C) 101,812 107,513 112,439 113,929 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 1,110,570 
F. Total Costs (Cumulative) (=B+D) 101,812 209,325 321,764 435,693 548,173 660,652 773,131 885,611 998,090 1,110,570   
 
BENEFITS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
G. Total Benefits (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H. Total Benefits (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
NET UNDISCOUNTED COST*  (=E-G) 101,812 107,513 112,439 113,929 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 112,479 1,110,570 
DISCOUNT FACTOR @ 3.5% p.a. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
NET PRESENT COST* (Annual) 101,812 103,877 104,963 102,758 98,019 94,705 91,502 88,408 85,418 82,530 953,991 
NET PRESENT  COST* (Cumulative) 101,812 205,689 310,652 413,410 511,429 606,134 697,636 786,044 871,462 953,991   
TOTAL NET PRESENT COST* = 953,991 * A minus sign in these rows denotes a Net Present Value rather than a Net Present Cost.   
 
 
Add Row
Add Row
Add Row
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NPV @ 3.5% p.a.                       
APPRAISAL DATE: 16/01/2015                     
OPTION NUMBER & TITLE: Sensitivity  2 - 10% Process Efficiencies               
YEAR : Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 TOTAL 
 
CAPITAL COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
A. Total Capital Costs (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B. Total Capital Costs (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
 
REVENUE COSTS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
Staff Salaries 87,633 89,011 88,590 87,195 87,195 87,195 87,195 87,195 87,195 87,195 875,599 
Non Staff Costs 8,763 8,901 8,859 8,720 8,720 8,720 8,720 8,720 8,720 8,720 87,560 
Programme Management & Recruitment Costs 1,000 1,000 750               2,750 
Accommodation (Chair, Board and Directors) 180 120                 300 
Excess Fares 100 350 550 950 850 750 550 400     4,500 
C. Total Revenue Costs (Annual) 97,676 99,382 98,749 96,865 96,765 96,665 96,465 96,315 95,915 95,915 970,709 
D. Total Revenue Costs (Cumulative) 97,676 197,058 295,807 392,672 489,436 586,101 682,565 778,880 874,794 970,709   
E. Total Costs (Annual)  (=A+C) 97,676 99,382 98,749 96,865 96,765 96,665 96,465 96,315 95,915 95,915 970,709 
F. Total Costs (Cumulative) (=B+D) 97,676 197,058 295,807 392,672 489,436 586,101 682,565 778,880 874,794 970,709   
 
BENEFITS  (£ 000s): 
 
                      
G. Total Benefits (Annual) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H. Total Benefits (Cumulative) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
NET UNDISCOUNTED COST*  (=E-G) 97,676 99,382 98,749 96,865 96,765 96,665 96,465 96,315 95,915 95,915 970,709 
DISCOUNT FACTOR @ 3.5% p.a. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
NET PRESENT COST* (Annual) 97,676 96,021 92,183 87,366 84,325 81,389 78,474 75,702 72,839 70,375 836,351 
NET PRESENT  COST* (Cumulative) 97,676 193,698 285,881 373,247 457,572 538,961 617,435 693,137 765,976 836,351   
TOTAL NET PRESENT COST* = 836,351 * A minus sign in these rows denotes a Net Present Value rather than a Net Present Cost. 
 
 
Add Row
Add Row
Add Row
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ANNEX III: 
EDUCATION AUTHORITY PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
 
STRUCTURES TO DELIVER AN EDUCATION AUTHORITY PROGRAMME 
 
1. The work to establish the Education Authority will be delivered through a formally 
constituted Programme, (the Education Authority Implementation Programme), 
utilising a formal project management system.  Seven projects should be 
undertaken: 
 
- Legislation, Equality and Communication:  
- Governance 
- Controlled Schools Support Council 
- Finance and Dissolution 
- Operations and Services 
- Human Resources 
- Review of Arm’s Length Bodies 
 
2. These projects will be delivered utilising, were possible, a combination of the 
existing staff in the EA Delivery Directorate and the EA Implementation Team.   
These staff will work together within a single programme structure reporting to the 
programme SRO and including other key leaders from across the Department 
(Finance; Education Workforce Development; Planning and Performance 
Management).  We should mobilise quickly to re-activate a number of the key 
workstreams that were advancing under the ESA model and start to re-engineer 
these to meet the requirements of the new programme. 
 
3. Drawing on the detailed work of the ESA Delivery Directorate and ESAIT, the 7 
projects are shown below, with potential staff resource allocated as follows  :  
 
Project 1 
 
Legislation, 
Equality and 
Communication 
Project 2 
 
Governance 
Project 3 
 
Finance and 
Dissolution 
Project 4 
 
Operations 
and Services 
Project 5 
 
HR 
 
 
Project 6 
 
Controlled 
Schools 
Support 
Council 
Project 7 
 
Review of 
Arm’s 
Length 
Bodies 
 
EADD & EAIT 
 
EADD 
 
EADD & 
EAIT 
 
EAIT 
 
EADD & 
EAIT 
 
EADD 
 
4. EADD and EAIT staff will provide Project Management services to the 
programme. 
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Programme Structure 
 
5. The Operations and Services Project (along with the EAIT strands of the shared 
projects) will be led by the Change Director within EAIT reporting to an EA 
Delivery Board.  The remaining projects within the programme will have a 
dedicated leader at G5 level within DE reporting to a DE Delivery Board. The 
Delivery Boards will report through a DE SRO and overarching Programme 
Management Board to the DE Minister.
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ANNEX IV:  Programme Structure 
EA IMPLEMENTATION GOVERNANCE 
 
Minister 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chairs of ELBs 
Programme Management Board 
 
 
DE Delivery Board 
 
     
EA Delivery Board 
 
 
HR 
 
Dissolution 
& Finance 
 
Governance 
 
Legislation, 
Equality& 
Comms 
 
 
 
CSSC 
 
Review of 
ALBs 
 
       
PMO 
 
Transition 
Board 
 
EAIT Project 
Teams 
 
1:1 ELB 
Operational 
Meetings 
 
Dissolution 
Steering 
Group 
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ANNEX V     EDUCATION AUTHORITY BENEFITS FRAMEWORK 
 
 OBJECTIVE 
Overarching 
statement of 
intent 
OUTCOME / END 
BENEFIT 
Eventual Benefit 
ENABLER 
New tangible capability 
delivered by the 
Education Authority 
OUTPUT/INTERMEDIATE BENEFIT  
Measurable benefit/ output 
TARGET 
Metrics against 
which benefit is to 
be measured 
1 To provide an 
administrative 
structure that is 
compatible with 
the new 11 
council model of 
local government; 
 
A regional 
structure that 
works well with the 
11 councils and 
provides for clear 
partnership 
arrangements in 
community 
planning 
Specific administrative 
arrangements and 
structures that allow for 
effective working with the 
11 councils and clear 
partnership arrangements 
in community planning. 
Agreed structures for the 
organisational design of the 
Education Authority – which clearly 
locate the arrangements and 
structures that allow for effective 
working with the 11 councils and 
clear partnership arrangements in 
community planning. 
By the end of 2017, 
for there to be 
structures within the 
Education Authority 
that, from the 
perspective of local 
councils, allow for 
effective working 
with the 11 councils 
and clear 
partnership 
arrangements in 
community planning. 
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 OBJECTIVE 
Overarching 
statement of 
intent 
OUTCOME / END 
BENEFIT 
Eventual Benefit 
ENABLER 
New tangible capability 
delivered by the 
Education Authority 
OUTPUT/INTERMEDIATE BENEFIT  
Measurable benefit/ output 
TARGET 
Metrics against 
which benefit is to 
be measured 
2 To maintain the 
delivery of 
services currently 
provided by the 
Education and 
Library Boards 
and maintain also 
the drive always 
to improve the 
effectiveness and 
efficiency of 
those services. 
That the 
effectiveness and 
efficiency of 
services is 
demonstrated in 
the performance of 
the Education 
Authority, its 
delivery of 
efficiencies,  and in 
the performance of 
DE in meeting its 
Programme for 
Government 
commitments. 
Regional services 
providing the same high 
quality services to all sub-
regions. 
 
The implementation of an 
organisational structure 
for the Education 
Authority, inclusive of a 
reduction in senior 
management as set out 
in Chapter 5. 
New regional services and 
organisational structures in place. 
By 2018, to have 
reduced the 
inherited workforce 
of the Authority (in 
line with the 
Monetary 
Assessment) to 
2426. 
 
By 2018, to have 
introduced 
regionalised 
services as set out 
in Benefit Profile B. 
 
By 2018 to have 
improved 
performance against 
the relevant 
Programme for 
Government targets 
in Education. 
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ANNEX VI      BENEFIT DEPENDENCY NETWORK (BDN)                                                                                     
 
ENABLERS 
Means of achieving intermediate and end 
benefits 
INTERMEDIATE BENEFITS 
Must be measurable 
END BENEFITS 
Strategic benefits 
The implementation of a single organisational 
structure by dissolving the 5 ELBs and Staff 
Commission to create the Education Authority.   
(a) Consistent regional delivery of education 
(b) Reduction in senior management workforce 
 
Consistent/Equitable/VFM education system 
Improved educational outcomes and reduction in 
educational under achievement  
Creation of an administrative structure compatible 
with the new 11 Council Model of local 
Government 
(c) Effective working with 11 Local Councils    Clear partnership arrangement in community 
planning 
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ANNEX VII                                                                                                                    BENEFIT PROFILES                                                                                                 
No 
A 
Benefit 
To deliver improved education outcomes 
Responsibilities for Achieving Benefit Responsibility for Managing Benefit 
Measurement 
EA Interim Chief Executive EA Director (TBC) 
Benefit Measure Assigned Method of Measurement Baseline Value Target  Value Actual 
Value 
Measurement 
to be done by 
Measurement 
Dates 
 
1. Achievement against 
education outcomes 
relevant to EA set out in 
the DE Corporate Plan 
 
1. DE examination data 
 
1. N/R 
 
1. As per Corporate Plan: 
- 90%+ of children achieving the expected level of 
communication in English/Irish at Key Stage 2; 
- 60%+ of children achieving the expected level of maths 
at Key Stage 2;  
- 85%+ of children achieving expected level of 
communication in English/Irish at Key Stage 3; 
- 85%+ of children achieving the expected level of maths 
at Key Stage 3;  
- 70%+ of school leavers achieving 5 GCSEs A*-C (or 
equivalent) inc. in English and Maths; 
- 70%+ of school leavers educated through medium or 
Irish achieving 5 GCSEs A*-C (or equivalent) inc. in 
Gaelige, English and Maths; and  
- 65%+ of FSME school leavers achieving 5 GCSEs A*-C 
(or equivalent) inc. in English and Maths.  
-  
 EA Annually 
Priority 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Likelihood of Failure 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Exposure Rating 
(Priority x Likelihood 
of Failure) 
Dependency on Other Benefits Benefit Category 
5 3 15 
 
 
 Non - Financial 
  Relevant PSA/ Departmental Targets 
Public Service Agreement 
How does the benefit meet the target? 
PFG 21: Increase the overall proportion of young people who achieve at least 5 GCSEs at A* - C or 
equivalent including GCSEs in Maths and English by the time they leave school. Increase the proportion of 
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds who achieve at least 5 GCSEs at A* - C or equivalent 
including GCSEs in Maths and English. 
PFG 42: Improve literacy and numeracy levels among all school leavers, with additional resources targeted 
at areas of educational underachievement. 
 
The system established by EA is intended directly to contribute to the educational attainment 
targets identified within PFG.  
Actions Required 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility for actions Expected Outcomes Start Date End Date 
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 TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be developed by EA     
Potential Risks Likelihood 
1 Low – 5 
High 
Impact on 
Benefit 
1 Low – 5 High 
Countermeasures Responsibility for 
Countermeasures 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be 
developed by EA 
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No 
B 
Benefit 
Consistent regional delivery of education 
Responsibilities for Achieving Benefit Responsibility for Managing Benefit Measurement 
EA Interim Chief Executive EA Director (TBC) 
Benefit Measure Assigned Method of Measurement Baseline Value Target  Value Actual Value Measurement 
to be done by 
Measurement Dates 
1. Design and implementation of 
single regional model for 
different service areas: 
- Early Years (including 
Surestart) + Preschool  
- Planning and Support 
- Music 
- Youth 
- Child Protection 
- Transport 
- Catering 
- Cleaning  
- Area Planning 
- Transfer and Open 
Enrolment  
- Capital programme 
- Asset Management 
- Planning and 
Management of Special 
Education 
- Psychology 
- Learning Support 
- School Development 
- Education Welfare 
1. Implementation dates 
against plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. N/R 1. Implementation Dates 
(TBC) for: 
- Early Years + Preschool 
Planning and Support  
- Surestart 
- Music  
- Youth  
- Child Protection  
- Transport  
- Catering  
- Cleaning  
- Area Planning  
- Transfer and Open Enrolment  
- Capital Programme  
- Asset Management  
- Planning and Management of 
Special Education  
- Psychology  
- Learning Support  
- School Development  
- Education Welfare  
 
 
 EA Ongoing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Priority 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Likelihood of Failure 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Exposure Rating 
(Priority x 
Likelihood of 
Failure) 
Dependency on Other 
Benefits 
Benefit Category 
5 3 15  Non – Financial  
  Relevant PSA/ Departmental Targets 
Public Service Agreement 
 
How does the benefit meet the target? 
PFG 21: Increase the overall proportion of young people who achieve at least 5 GCSEs at A* - 
C or equivalent including GCSEs in Maths and English by the time they leave school. Increase 
the proportion of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds who achieve at least 5 GCSEs 
at A* - C or equivalent including GCSEs in Maths and English. 
The system established by EA is intended directly to contribute to the educational attainment targets 
identified within PFG.  
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PFG 42: Improve literacy and numeracy levels among all school leavers, with additional 
resources targeted at areas of educational underachievement. 
Actions Required 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility for actions Expected Outcomes Start Date End Date 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be developed by EA     
Potential Risks Likelihood 
1 Low – 5 
High 
Impact on 
Benefit 
1 Low – 5 High 
Countermeasures Responsibility for 
Countermeasures 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be 
developed by EA 
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No 
C 
Benefit 
Reduction in senior management workforce  
Responsibilities for Achieving Benefit Responsibility for Managing Benefit Measurement 
EA Interim Chief Executive EA Director (TBC) 
Benefit Measure Assigned Method of Measurement Baseline Value Target  Value Actual Value Measurement 
to be done by 
Measurement Dates 
1. Number of staff within EA 
Baseline 
1.  Staff baseline review – 
headcount and cost 
1. 52 as at 1 Sept  2014 
 
1. Reduction of 30 posts by 
2018/19 
 EA Annually 
 
Priority 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Likelihood of Failure 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Exposure Rating 
(Priority x Likelihood 
of Failure) 
Dependency on Other 
Benefits 
Benefit Category 
4 2 8  Financial 
  Relevant PSA/ Departmental Targets 
Public Service Agreement 
How does the benefit meet the target? 
  
Actions Required 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility for actions Expected Outcomes Start Date End Date 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be developed by EA     
Potential Risks Likelihood 
1 Low – 5 
High 
Impact on 
Benefit 
1 Low – 5 High 
Countermeasures Responsibility for 
Countermeasures 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be 
developed by EA 
    
  
No 
D 
Benefit 
Effective working with 11 Local Councils   
Responsibilities for Achieving Benefit Responsibility for Managing Benefit Measurement 
EA Interim Chief Executive EA Director (TBC) 
Benefit Measure 
Assigned 
Method of Measurement Baseline Value Target  Value Actual Value Measure
ment to 
be done 
by 
Measurement Dates 
1. Clear partnership 
arrangement in 
Community planning 
 
1. Structures in place within the 
Education Authority  
 
1. N/R 
 
1. 2017 
 
 EA Annually 
Priority 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Likelihood of Failure 
1 very low to 5 very high 
Exposure Rating 
(Priority x Likelihood 
of Failure) 
Dependency on Other 
Benefits 
Benefit Category 
5 3 15  Non – Financial and Financial 
  Relevant PSA/ Departmental Targets 
Public Service Agreement 
How does the benefit meet the target? 
  
Actions Required 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility for actions Expected Outcomes Start Date End Date 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan to be 
developed by EA 
    
Potential Risks Likelihood 
1 Low – 5 
High 
Impact on Benefit 
1 Low – 5 High 
Countermeasures Responsibility for 
Countermeasures 
TBC within Benefits Realisation Plan 
to be developed by EA 
    
     
  
ANNEX VIII 
The Education and Libraries (NI) Order 1986 
Article 3(2). 
SCHEDULE 1 
NAMES AND AREAS OF EDUCATION AND LIBRARY BOARDS 
1 2 
Name of Board Name of Local Government District 
The Belfast Education and Library Board. Belfast. 
The South-Eastern Education and Library Board. Ards. 
 
Castlereagh. 
 
Down. 
 
Lisburn. 
 
North Down. 
The Southern Education and Library Board. Armagh. 
 
Banbridge. 
 
Cookstown. 
 
Craigavon. 
 
Dungannon. 
 
Newry and Mourne. 
The Western Education and Library Board. Fermanagh. 
 
Limavady. 
 
Derry. 
 
Omagh. 
 
Strabane. 
The North-Eastern Education and Library Board. Antrim. 
 
Ballymena. 
 
Ballymoney. 
 
Carrickfergus. 
 
Coleraine. 
 
Larne. 
 
Magherafelt. 
 
Moyle. 
 
Newtownabbey. 
 
